



Psychological Consultation in Hostage/Barricade Crisis Negotiation

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Introduction: This chapter focuses on advances in hostage/barricade crisis negotiation. In particular this chapter examines how mental health consultants can provide assistance to law enforcement negotiators. Therefore, the following discussion concentrates, in part, on ways a crisis incident can be classified, discusses different negotiation techniques and methods of negotiation analyses, explores the empirical bases that currently support these findings, and, finally, examines the impact, on the victims, of being taken hostage and how best to ameliorate that impact.

March of 1972 is usually considered the watershed moment in modern history regarding hostage incidents. It was in that month, during the 1972 Olympic Games, that the “Munich Massacre” occurred. Palestinian terrorists took hostage eleven Israeli athletes. At the conclusion of the incident twenty two people were dead: a policeman, ten terrorists, and all the hostages (Soskis and Van Zandt, 1986). Following this and similar incidents, law enforcement policy specialists sought an alternative to the traditional use of force in hostage/barricade situations. For example, in 1973 the New York City Police Department began using detectives trained as negotiators in hostage/barricade incidents. (Bolz and Hershey, 1979; Schlossberg, 1980). Shortly thereafter, the FBI developed a hostage negotiation program (Soskis and Van Zandt, 1986).

Over the last twenty-five years law enforcement agencies’ use of trained crisis negotiators has increased dramatically. Research performed in 1993 suggested that a majority of law enforcement organizations in the United States (68% of state police agencies, 96% of large municipal agencies, and 30% of the small municipal agencies) employed trained negotiators (Butler, Leitenberg, and Fuselier, 1993). Later investigation found that most of these specialists were deployed approximately 11 times a year, worked part-time as negotiators having other law

enforcement duties, and received about 32 hours of negotiation training a year (Bahn and Loudon, 1999). As the years have gone by hostage/barricade crisis negotiation has, more and more, been accepted as a worthwhile tool. Noesner (1999, p. 6) writes that crisis negotiation is “one of the most important [instruments] available in law enforcement to peacefully resolve crisis events.” In accord, Regini (2002, p.1) states, “Crisis negotiation is one of law enforcement’s most effective tools. The successful resolution of tens of thousands of hostage, barricade, attempted suicide, and kidnapping cases throughout the world repeatedly has demonstrated its value.” In fact, recent analysis of the Hostage Barricade Database System (HOBAS) data maintained by the FBI supports these assertions. Data analyses from 2002 to 2003 indicate that 82% of the reported hostage/barricade incidents were resolved without death or injury to the perpetrator or the victim (Flood, 2003).

There are three types of crisis situations where a negotiator can be used: (1) hostage incidents; (2) barricade-victim incidents; and (3) barricade-no victim incidents. Traditionally, hostage situations occur when one or more hostage takers hold one or more hostages against their will, threatening them harm, unless a third party meets the hostage taker’s demands. Thus, traditional hostage taking is a triadic event—an event that involves three participants. (Soskis and Van Zandt, 1986; Call, 1996; Call, 2003).

In a barricade-victim incident, the captor holds one or more victims against their will, threatening them harm, but has no interest in negotiating with a third party. Instead the hostage taker holds the victim for an expressive purpose. Thus this incident is, initially, a dyadic rather than a triadic event. Expressive hostage taking is motivated by internal emotions and impulses rather than to achieve an objective goal (Miron and Goldstein, 1979; Call, 2003). Technically,

the person held is not a hostage but a victim who is captured and restrained in order to express anger at him or her, a situation, or events (Noesner, 1999; Call, 2003; Royce, 2005).

In a barricade-no victim incident the perpetrator is armed and barricaded but there is no hostage or captive. Examples of this type of crisis situation range from a trapped criminal who has the clear instrumental goal of escape to a mentally ill person who is in the midst of a personal crisis and is suicidal.

Crisis negotiation is a team endeavor. One should never negotiate alone. Depending upon the circumstances, teams may range from three to six persons staged in three shifts (Fuselier and Van Zandt, 1987; Lancelo, 1999). Given the emotional and behavioral complexity associated with crisis negotiation the use of a behavioral science consultant as a team member is recommended (Butler, Leitenberg, and Fuselier, 1993).

Pertinent Legal Cases: Legal issues most relevant to crisis negotiation are those related to: application of the fourth amendment as it applies to unreasonable searches and seizure; admissibility into evidence of a perpetrator's statements made during negotiation; enforceability of negotiator's promises; use of surveillance equipment; use of force; and controlling the media during negotiations (Higginbotham, 1994). Guidance regarding these six issues is provided below.

Fourth amendment issues. Police may enter a dwelling in a crisis situation without a warrant. However, the purpose of the entry must be to provide immediate aid to victims, to arrest the perpetrator, and/or to provide such other services immediately required to resolve the emergency (*Mincey vs. Arizona*, 1978).

Statement admissibility issues. A perpetrator's statements made during negotiation are admissible as evidence at trial. The *Miranda* rule does not apply since during negotiations the perpetrator is neither in the custody of the police nor is the perpetrator being subjected to interrogation (*People vs. Gantz*, 1984).

Negotiator's promise issues. Although during a crisis negotiation a negotiator may promise the perpetrator certain things in an attempt to successfully mediate surrender the government is under no obligation to enforce the promise(s). Such action is void as against public policy. (*State vs. Sands*, 1985).

Surveillance issues. Generally, federal law prohibits the electronic interception of telephone conversations or oral conversations where the speakers have a reasonable expectation of privacy, without a court order, or without the consent of one of the parties to the conversation. However, federal law permits electronic surveillance in emergency situations, i.e. those instances where there exists a danger of death or serious injury, as long as the emergency interception has been approved by senior prosecutorial personnel and the application for a court order is made within 48 hours of the first interception.

Use of force issues. Even though negotiations are in progress, it is permissible to use deadly force if police have probable cause to believe that the perpetrator poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the police or to others. Further, it is permissible to use deadly force to prevent escape if there is probable cause to believe that the perpetrator has committed a crime involving the infliction of serious physical harm or the threat of serious physical harm and, if feasible, some warning has been given. (*Tennessee vs. Gardner*, 1985). However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit chastised the FBI's use of deadly force during negotiations in a hijacked airliner incident, finding that they had turned "what had been a successful 'waiting

game', during which two persons safely left the plane, into a 'shooting match' that left three persons dead" (*Downs vs. U.S.*, 1975, p. 1002).

Control of media issues. The media have the right to gather news from any source within the law. But the media does not have a constitutional right of special access. Thus the media have no guaranteed right of access to disaster or crime scenes where the general public has been excluded (*Branzburg vs. Hayes*, 1972).

Applied Ethics and Moral Considerations: To date there are no accepted guidelines as to best practice with respect to providing psychological consultation to law enforcement crisis negotiators. Even so, the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct § 2.01 (e) (2002, p. 5) states that even in those "emerging areas in which generally recognized standards for preparatory training do not yet exist, psychologists nevertheless take reasonable steps to ensure the competence of their work and to protect clients/patients, students, supervisees, research participants, organizational clients, and others from harm". Thus, it is incumbent upon the psychologist who consults with law enforcement crisis negotiation teams to take steps to ensure competence.

At a minimum, ensuring such competence would include attending the same crisis intervention courses as the law enforcement negotiator as well as being conversant with the existing scientific and law enforcement literature regarding crisis negotiation. Furthermore, Butler et al. (1993) noted that the psychological consultant must demonstrate adequate clinical training and experience, be familiar with applicable forensic issues, understand the organization and structure of law enforcement agencies, and be willing to work within the law enforcement system.

Likewise, the American Psychological Association has made it clear that when psychologists serve in *any* position by virtue of their training as a psychologist the APA Ethics Code is applicable to their conduct (American Psychological Association, 2005). Thus the argument that the code does not apply to psychologists acting in roles other than traditional health-service provider relationships holds no weight. Of course this means that the psychologist consultant must consider every section of the code and ask himself or herself how it might apply to his or her actions in various crises situation scenarios. For example, one of the principal functions of a psychological consultant is to provide the negotiator with a diagnosis and assessment of the hostage/barricade subject (Feldmann, 2004). Such information can be crucial in formulating negotiation strategy as well as help the negotiator and crisis commander assess negotiation progress and the threat of imminent lethality. But what if that information is ultimately used, in part, to implement a tactical solution to the crisis, one that results in the injury or death of the perpetrator? Recently, the American Psychological Association stated that psychologists must not use health care-related information to the detriment of an individual's well being and safety even when providing consultation in interrogation or information-gathering processes for national security-related purposes. The basis for this decision was Principle A, "Do No Harm" and Principle B which addresses the psychologist's responsibilities to society. In other words, psychologists should do no harm and, in fact, should use their expertise to aid in the prevention of harm.

Does this decision mean that a psychologist can not provide his or her law enforcement team mates health care-related information regarding a hostage taker because it might, ultimately, be used in a way to physically harm the individual? As of yet the American Psychological Association has not made a formal ruling on this issue. Debatably, there exist

crucial differences between the ethical duties a consulting forensic psychologist owes a prisoner undergoing interrogation versus a hostage taker holding a gun to the head of a victim. First, the hostage taker is not in the custody of the authorities, but is a free agent. Second, the perpetrator is not undergoing interrogation, but is in the act of committing a felony. Third, there exists no professional relationship between the hostage taker and the consulting psychologist, not even a vicarious relationship since the perpetrator is not being held by the authorities. Fourth, the perpetrator is an imminent deadly threat to innocent third parties; if the crisis situation is not resolved people are going to die. Arguably, because of these differences, Principles A and B would not prevent the psychologist from providing his or her law enforcement teammates health care related information regarding the hostage taker.

Empirically-based Methods and Applications: Ten years ago Call (1996) lamented the fact that there was no ongoing nationwide collection of information regarding hostage incidents and that there was little, if any, empirical research regarding the effectiveness of specific negotiation techniques. With respect to this latter issue Vecchi, Van Hasselt, and Romano (2005, p. 549) note that even after ten years, “investigative efforts to prescriptively apply the most efficacious negotiation strategies based on empirically grounded decision-making have yet to be conducted.” Thus, the title of this section is obviously somewhat misleading. In significant part the training of crisis negotiation techniques continues to be guided by experienced negotiators passing on skills to their younger colleagues. Therefore, what will be discussed below is a synopsis of the current level of professional opinion based upon both anecdotal and the existing empirical literature.

Crisis event classifications. In order to successfully negotiate a crisis situation the negotiator must, eventually, interact with the perpetrator using normative bargaining techniques (Donohue, Ramesh, Kaufmann, and Smith, 1991). Thus, a key initial question the negotiator must ask and answer is whether or not there exists a bargaining range. One way to investigate this question is to understand the classification or typology of the crisis incident. In other words, some types or classes of crisis events have, by their very nature, a greater bargaining range as compared to other types. Knowing this at the outset can help the negotiator craft a negotiating strategy as well as predict success or failure.

There are five different typologies, or ways to systematically classify a crisis incident, none of which are mutually exclusive. These are: (1) crisis incident typology; (2) demand typology; (3) siege typology; (4); victim location vs. perpetrator demand typology and (5) hostage taker typology.

The first classification scheme was discussed earlier. This scheme divides crisis incidents into three types: hostage situations, barricade-victim situations, and barricade-no victim situations. In the traditional hostage situation the hostage taker makes substantive demands, usually instrumental, of a third party threatening harm to the hostages if the demands are not met. Typical characteristics of a hostage incident are: (1) the hostage taker is, to a significant degree, goal oriented; (2) the hostage taker makes substantive demands; (3) the hostage taker's primary goal is having the demands met; (4) the hostage taker realizes that he or she needs the police to help obtain his or her goal; and (5) the hostage taker realizes that keeping the hostages alive prevents a tactical response by the police.

In the barricade-victim situation the perpetrator does not make substantive demands of a third party. The perpetrator already has what he wants—the victim. Typical characteristics of a

barricade-victim situation are: (1) no substantive demands or objective goal; (2) perpetrator's focus is directed against the victim; and (3) absence of rational thinking and prominence of expressive and emotional ventilation.

In the barricade-no victim situation the perpetrator may or may not be willing to bargain. The existence of a bargaining range depends upon whether or not the barricaded individual has substantive demands.

Understanding a perpetrator's demand type is another way to classify a crisis situation. There are four general types of demands: instrumental, expressive, substantive, and non-substantive. An instrumental demand is best described as objective, goal oriented, and substantive. For example, a demand for money, a getaway car, or the release of political prisoners are instrumental demands. An expressive demand is also goal oriented but is subjective in nature, one which is unique to the mind set of the perpetrator. Examples of expressive demands are a perpetrator wanting to talk to an ex-wife or a perpetrator demanding that a boss apologize for alleged wrongdoing. Substantive demands are those that have obvious value, at least to the perpetrator. Substantive demands may be either expressive or instrumental. Non-substantive demands are those that, in actual fact, have no real value, even to the perpetrator and/or are not related in any way to the victim. A non-substantive demand also includes those situations where no demands are made.

Another way to profile crisis events is to classify the incident as to whether or not the location of the victim and perpetrator are known and contained (a siege) or whether this information is unknown, a non-siege or kidnapping (Lancely, 1999). At one end of this continuum, where the location is known and the perpetrator is making substantive demands, the ability to bargain exists. On the other end of this continuum, where the location is unknown and

the perpetrator is making non-substantive demands, including no demands, then the ability to bargain does not exist.

Sieges can be further classified into three types: deliberate siege, spontaneous siege, and anticipated siege. In a deliberate siege the perpetrator intentionally initiates the siege situation. The negotiator may or may not have bargaining ability depending upon whether or not the incident is a hostage situation, barricade-victim situation, or barricade-no victim situation and whether or not substantive or non-substantive demands are made.

A spontaneous siege occurs inadvertently, such as when an armed robbery goes awry. Victims may or may not be present. Substantive demands may or may not be made. Again if the perpetrator makes substantive demands, particularly if the demands are instrumental in nature a bargaining range is believed to exist.

An anticipated siege is one where the perpetrator and law enforcement expected that, at some point in time, the authorities would attempt to arrest the former. Examples are the siege and negotiations that occurred in the early 1990's between the FBI and the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas and, some years later, between the FBI and the Montana Freeman. Substantive demands are usually not made in a barricade-no victim situation. Substantive demands may or may not be made if the siege is a hostage situation.

Hostage taker typology is one last way a negotiator can classify the crisis situation (Call, 1996; Call 2003; See Table 1). Six major types of hostage takers are enumerated: emotionally disturbed; political extremist; religious fanatics; criminals; prison inmates; and a combination of two or more of the above. Further, there are multiple subtypes. Under the emotionally disturbed category there are seven subtypes: brain damaged; elderly/senile; depressed, various types;

paranoid, various types; schizophrenic; substance abuser; and personal/family disputes (Pearce, 1977; Gist and Perry, 1985; Strentz, 1986; Fuselier, 1988; Kennedy and Dyer, 1992).

Knutson (1980) described two types of political extremist hostage takers: the reluctant captor and the deliberate hostage taker. Her research suggested the former were best described as dreamers and philosophers whose violent act was part of an attempt to right a wrong and who indicated that they were unwilling to kill their hostages. The deliberate hostage taker, on the other hand, is described as perfectly willing to kill his or her captives.

Perhaps a better way to understand political extremist hostage takers is to use Ferracuti's (1982) conceptualization—the subcultural theory. He argued that the best approach to understanding this type of perpetrator is to examine and understand the unique self-imposed value system and mores within which the political extremist exists. Global theories applicable to all political extremists are probably unobtainable. True understanding can only come via thorough investigation of each subculture.

An example of the results of such an investigation is provided by Ferracuti and Bruno (1981). These two researchers studied right-wing Italian terrorists and then conceptualized a set of traits that they termed the “authoritarian-extremist personality.” Note that these traits are only relevant to the political extremists studied, i.e., the right-wing Italian terrorist. Ferracuti and Bruno (1981) described this particular terrorist personality style or subtype in the following manner:

1. Ambivalent feelings towards authority.
2. Lack of psychological insight.
3. Conventional behavior patterns.
4. Emotionally detached from the consequences of their actions.

5. Sexual identity disturbances.
6. Superstitious and magical thinking.
7. Self-destructive.
8. Below normal educational experiences.
9. Perceives weapons as fetishes and follows violent subcultural norms.

Cooper (1981) first discussed the religious fanatic hostage taker. To better understand this category's possible subtypes the advice of Ferracuti (1982) regarding the examination of a particular cult's internal mores and values should be followed.

The criminal category is generally held to include, primarily, the trapped criminal or the kidnapper. The major subtype is the criminal psychopath. The criminal psychopath is believed to be a major subtype in the prison category as well. Finally, the last category is reserved for those hostage takers who obviously belong to two or more of the five earlier categories.

Crisis Event Databases: Systematic nationwide collection of hostage incident information did not begin until 1996. In that year the FBI initiated the use of the Hostage/Barricade Report (HOBAS). HOBAS is a hostage and barricade incident data-collection questionnaire. Local law enforcement is requested to complete this questionnaire and forward it to the FBI after each crisis incident. The HOBAS questionnaire requests data as it relates to: the incident; the nature of contacts made by law enforcement during the incident; resolution of the incident; post-incident information; ancillary information regarding the negotiator and SWAT interaction and training; subject data; and hostage/victim data. Vecchi et al. (2005) report that the HOBAS database now contains over 3800 hostage/barricade incidents.

Prior to the initiation of HOBAS, a thorough review of the literature revealed the existence of only five earlier hostage incident databases. These are the ITERATE database

developed by Micklous (1976); the HEAD database developed by Head (1990); the New York Police Department Hostage Recovery Program database analyzed by Head (1990); a small database developed by Friedland and Merari (1992); a database developed by Butler et al. (1993); and a database developed by Feldmann (1998; 2001).

Mickolus (1976) developed a database of over 3,329 international terrorist incidents from 1968 through 1977. He termed this database ITERATE which stood for International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events. A subset of this database (539 events) which occurred between January 1970 and July 1974 was analyzed by Corsi (1981). Head (1990) performed a more thorough analysis of the ITERATE data, using all 3,329 incidents, and published his results in 1990. Given that the ITERATE data is over 30 years old, excludes all hostage events which occurred in the United States, and has been thoroughly reported elsewhere (Call, 1996) this data will not be examined in detail in the present chapter.

Friedland and Merari (1992) investigated 69 incidents of international and domestic political extremist hostage taking which occurred between 1979 and 1988. They excluded kidnap cases from their database. Their results suggested that hijacking of airplanes and barricade incidents occurred with equal frequency (46.4% each). The average number of hostages in a barricade incident was 35 and the average number of hostages in a hijacking incident was 131. There were five or fewer hostage takers in 63.3% of the cases. Hostage takers used teams of between 6 and 10 in 15% of the cases and teams of 10 or more in 23.3% of the cases.

The results also indicated that the hostage situation lasted 24 hours or less (43.8%). The most frequent outcome was violent, i.e. assault by the authorities (31.1%). Violence was more

likely when the hostage situation was a barricade situation, a trained rescue team was available and no attempts at negotiation were made.

Unconditional surrender occurred in 19.7% of the incidents. In 36% of the incidents the event concluded after the authorities met the hostage takers' demands in full or in part.

In 1990 Head reported his analysis of 3,330 incidents of domestic hostage taking that occurred between 1973 and 1982. He termed this database the Hostage Event Analytic Database (HEAD). In summary the analysis indicated:

1. The majority of the perpetrators fit the criminal or prison inmate typology (52%).
2. The second largest typology of perpetrators were the political extremist/ religious fanatic (21%) followed by the emotionally disturbed (18%).
3. The majority of perpetrators were young (25% below age 30), white (61%), male (80%) and acted alone.
4. The usual number of victims captured was one (47%) or two (15%).
5. The most common location for the crisis event was a form of transportation (35%) followed by a home (20%).
6. The most common motivation for the perpetrator's actions was political/publicity (33%) followed by money (23%).
7. The most common weapon used was a firearm (31%).
8. The most common event duration was one day or less (53%).
9. The majority of incidents were non-lethal (87%). However, hostages were more at risk for injury than the hostage taker.
10. The majority of incidents were negotiated (64%).

Head also analyzed 137 incidents which occurred between 1973 and 1982 by the New York Police Department Hostage Recovery Program. In summary the analysis indicated:

1. The majority of the perpetrators fit the criminal or prison inmate typology (58%)
2. The second largest typology of perpetrators were emotionally disturbed (26%).
3. The majority of perpetrators were young (46% below age 30), white (35%), male (87%) and acted alone.
4. The usual number of victims captured was one (43%) or two (26%).
5. The most common location for the crisis event was a home (41%) followed by a public place (28%).
6. The most common motivation for the perpetrator's actions was money (39%) followed by family dispute (16%).
7. The most common weapon used was a firearm (41%).
8. The most common event duration was one day or less than one day (72%).
9. The majority of incidents were non-lethal (91%). However, hostages were more at risk for injury than the hostage taker.

Butler et al. (1993) studied 410 hostage incidents that occurred between 1986 and 1988.

These researchers found:

1. The majority of the perpetrators fit the emotionally disturbed typology (71% large police departments, 88% small police department, 38% state police).
2. The second largest typology for the large and small police departments was criminal (15% large police departments, 6% small police department) and, for the state police, prison inmates (22%).
3. The majority of incidents were non-lethal (>90%).

4. Negotiators were used in every incident.

Feldmann (1998; 2001) analyzed a database of 120 hostage/barricade incidents that occurred in Kentucky. In summary his data indicated:

1. The majority of the perpetrators fit the personal/family dispute typology (31%).
2. The second largest typology of perpetrators was criminal (26%) followed by the emotionally disturbed (19%).
3. The majority of perpetrators were young (below age 30), male, and acted alone.
4. The most common motivation for the perpetrator's actions was an interpersonal dispute complicated by an underlying psychiatric disorder as well as alcohol or drug use.
5. The most common weapon used was a firearm (75%).
6. The majority of incidents ended in injury or death to either some of the hostages or to the perpetrator (88%).
7. The majority of incidents were negotiated, but negotiations were successful in less than 40% of the time.

Of further interest in the Feldmann database are the unique characteristics observed with respect to the personal/family dispute category, the criminal category, the emotionally disturbed category, and the workplace violence category. Characteristics of the personal/family dispute category were:

1. The perpetrator was usually a white male in his early 30s or late 20s.
2. The victim was usually a current or former spouse, girlfriend or child.
3. The victim was stalked prior to the incident (66% of the cases) and threatened or harassed prior to the incident in 80% of the cases.

4. The incident usually occurred in a home.
5. Negotiations were successful in only a minority of cases (33%) and injuries or death occurred in 95% of the cases.

These results obviously support the anecdotal observation that barricade-victim incidents are much more deadly than the traditional hostage situation.

Characteristics of the criminal category were:

1. The perpetrators were primarily African-American males in their mid 20s.
2. The incident was most often the result of a failed robbery attempt (74%).
3. Negotiations were successful in 68% and injuries or death occurred in 45% of the cases.

Once again these results support the observation that hostage incidents, opposed to a barricade-victim incident, provide the negotiator with greater bargaining range which results in increased negotiation success and fewer injuries and deaths.

Characteristics of the emotionally disturbed category were:

1. The perpetrators were typically in their mid 30s.
2. The most common location was a public place.
3. The incident was usually a barricade-no victim situation.
4. Demands were expressive, bizarre, and non-substantive in nature.
5. Negotiations were usually unsuccessful with most incidents being resolved with a tactical assault.
6. There was a relatively low injury or fatality rate.

These results suggest that negotiating with a severely mentally ill individual is a difficult process.

Distinctive characteristics observed in the workplace violence category were:

1. The perpetrator was typically an older individual, usually in his mid 40s.
2. The perpetrator had often served in the military (50%) and had an excessive interests in weapons (>60%).
3. Negotiations were typically unsuccessful, with a high likelihood of injury and death, and a high likelihood of suicide.

Workplace violence can be conceptualized as one form of the personal/family dispute category where the incident is a barricade-victim situation and not a traditional hostage situation. Thus, once more, the data supports the idea that such incidents inherently provide the negotiator with less bargaining ability and are inherently more lethal.

In line with Feldmann's (1998, 2001) findings, recent analysis of the HOBAS database indicates that over 90% of all reported hostage/barricade incidents were in fact non-hostage or barricade-victim situations (Flood, 2003). In other words, the victim was taken captive for expressive reasons and was, in fact, a "homicide-to-be".

Crisis negotiation technique. Historically, law enforcement negotiators utilized only problem solving techniques to respond, manage, and resolve crisis incidents. For example, many negotiators were taught to use Fisher, Ury and Patton's (1991) negotiation model which taught first to concentrate on separating the person from the problem; then to focus on mutual interests instead of individual positions; next to generate options for mutual gain; and, finally, to insist on using objective criteria to judge the effectiveness of the agreement. The problem with such an approach is that it assumes the perpetrator enters into the negotiation process with his or her rational cognitive processes intact. Usually this is just not the case.

Even in those incidents where the perpetrator has planned or anticipated the hostage or barricade situation he or she will almost always be in a state of autonomic nervous system hyper-arousal. Therefore, it should be expected that, initially, the perpetrator will display above average emotionality, below average attention span as well as narrow, constricted, and disorganized thinking. Further, when one considers the database analyses discussed above, in particular the recent HOBAS results which suggest that over 90% of reported incidents are non-hostage, crisis situations, then the immediate use of problem solving techniques is not appropriate (Vecchi, Van Hasselt, and Romano, 2005).

Therefore, the negotiator must expect that, more often than not, the perpetrator in a crisis incident is experiencing a crisis state. According to Vecchi et al. (2005) the characteristics of a crisis state are: the perpetrator is behaving in an emotional and irrational manner as opposed to a cognitive and rational fashion in response to an event or situation the perpetrator perceives as overwhelming—a threat to his or her psychological and/or physical well being; and, the precipitating event is recent, usually having occurred only within the past 24 to 48 hours.

These authors further argue that there are four phases to a crisis. These are termed pre-crisis, crisis, accommodation/negotiation, and resolution. It is during the crisis stage that the incident, be it barricade-victim or barricade-no victim, happens and the law enforcement negotiator is asked to intervene. Further, the goals of crisis intervention are to establish communication and develop rapport, buy time, defuse intense emotions, and gather intelligence and information so as to determine which negotiation strategies and techniques to use.

All authors agree that, initially, the negotiator should attempt to develop a relationship with the perpetrator (Rogan, Donohue, and Lyles, 1990; Schlossberg, 1980). This is conceived of as a negotiation within a negotiation (Donohue and Roberto, 1993). The Behavioral Change

Stairway Model (BCSM) is the method taught by the FBI's Crisis Negotiation Unit and is designed to achieve this relationship-building process between perpetrator and negotiator. The BCSM process occurs in five phases: active listening, empathy, rapport, influence, and behavioral change. To achieve rapport the negotiator must use and maintain active listening and empathy throughout the negotiation process. Then, with the establishment of the necessary rapport the negotiator can utilize his or her new found influence to effect behavioral change and, hopefully, successful resolution of the incident (Vecchi, Van Hasselt, and Romano, 2005).

Active listening is the primary tool of the BCSM process, particularly in the early stages of negotiation. Active listening consists of core and supplemental skills (see Table 2 and Table 3).

Donohue, Ramesh, Kaufmann, and Smith (1991) compare and contrast crisis bargaining, also known as distributive bargaining, versus normative bargaining, also known as integrative bargaining. These authors write that, initially, the hostage taker typically uses crisis bargaining. This style of bargaining is manifested by:

1. coercion and threats,
2. high stakes and feelings of urgency,
3. elevated emotionality,
4. seeking only one alternative,
5. reliance upon incomplete information,
6. overabundance and over concern with face or ego issues, and
7. failure to develop detailed plans.

The negotiator attempts to move the hostage taker away from crisis bargaining and toward normative or cooperative bargaining. This style of bargaining attempts to:

1. slow down the negotiation process,
2. decrease and control emotions,
3. develop multiple options or alternatives,
4. create informational resources,
5. avoid face issues, and
6. use detailed plans.

Donohue et al. (1991) argue that the negotiation occurs in five stages: intelligence gathering, introduction and relationship development, problem clarification and relationship development, problem solving, and resolution. Donohue and Roberto (1996) note that negotiation may progress in a step-wise fashion from crisis bargaining to normative bargaining; that negotiation progress may be intermixed, sometimes integrative and sometime distributive; and that negotiation may not progress at all but remain fixed with the perpetrator continuing in the crisis mode while the negotiator attempts to bargain normatively.

According to Vecchi et al. (2005) there are four stages in crisis negotiation. These are: dealing with emotions, establishing communication, identifying the precipitating event, and problems solving. Problem solving is further broken down into six tasks: describing the problem, brainstorming alternative resolutions, purging unacceptable resolutions, selecting and agreeing upon an acceptable resolution, putting the plan in place, and executing the plan.

Giebels, Noelanders, and Vervaeke (2005) approached the exploration of negotiation strategy from a different point of view—that of the hostages themselves. These researchers interviewed eleven ex-hostages, seven which had been held in sieges and four who had been kidnapped. More about the hostages' experiences will be discussed later. However, with respect to negotiation technique Giebels et al. concluded that “little attention is paid to opportunities to

promote the psychological well-being of the hostages during their captivity” (p. 249). Thus, they urged that, in the future, negotiators address this issue in a more systematic manner and seek psychological consultants’ advice in this area. Finally, Giebels et al. provided the following general guidelines for estimating and promoting the hostages psychological well-being during captivity:

1. The negotiator should let the hostages know that they matter;
2. Hostages need to believe that the negotiators are experienced and proficient;
3. Hostages appreciate frequent contact between the negotiator and the perpetrator.
Those that have not been physically abused listen carefully to the negotiations. Those that have been physically abused utilize these periods as times to relax.
4. In kidnapping situations it is psychologically important for the hostage to know that the negotiator has sought proof of life. This knowledge reduces the hostages’ uncertainty, provides moral support, and reinforces the victims’ social identity.
5. Negotiators should anticipate that the captives will develop both positive and negative feelings toward the perpetrators, particularly if they are not physically abused and/or if the incident is prolonged. Negotiators should also anticipate that as time goes by victims’ feelings of uncertainty will increase.
6. Negotiators should analyze the social dynamics of multiple hostages and hostage takers as it may impact victim survival. Areas of investigation and concern are the development of hostage to hostage support, hostage to hostage anger, in-group (hostages) versus out-group (perpetrator) dynamics which could be detrimental to victim survival, and the possible existence of less violent perpetrators who may act as protective buffers between the victims and the more violent hostage takers.

7. Negotiators should analyze the possible role expectations of the hostages and how that may impact victim survival. For example, do one or more of the hostages have a law enforcement or military background and, if so, will they precipitate a confrontation with the perpetrator and/or attempt an escape?
8. Negotiation team members should anticipate that the victims' families are also victims. Thus actions should be directed to help them cope, i.e. keeping a diary, writing letters to the victims, and/or discussing what is happening.

In any crisis negotiation the negotiator must continually assess negotiation progress and the likelihood of imminent lethality. The literature suggests that there are eleven factors which signify negotiation progress and fourteen factors which suggest imminent lethality (Call, 2003; Crisis Management Consultants, Inc., 2002; Fuselier and Romana, 1996; Fuselier and Van Zandt, 1987; Lancelly, 1999; Soskis and Van Zandt, 1986). Factors which suggest progress are:

1. No additional injuries have occurred since negotiations have started;
2. Threats have decreased;
3. Instrumental demands have decreased.
4. The perpetrator's conversation level has increased;
5. The perpetrator makes more personal statements;
6. The perpetrator is behaving and conversing less emotionally and more rationally;
7. Some level of rapport has developed between perpetrator and negotiator;
8. Normative, or integrative, bargaining has increased and crisis, or distributive, bargaining has decreased;
9. Deadlines have passed with no injuries;
10. Some hostages have been released;

11. Surrender discussions have begun between the perpetrator and negotiator.

Factors which suggest imminent lethality are:

1. Additional injuries have occurred since negotiations have started;
2. Threats have increased;
3. The incident was a deliberate confrontation between the perpetrator and police and there has been no escape attempt;
4. The captive is known to the perpetrator, was selected by the perpetrator, and there is a history of interpersonal problems between the captive and perpetrator;
5. The perpetrator has committed similar incidents in the past;
6. The perpetrator believes that he or she has suffered a recent overwhelming life stressor;
7. The perpetrator believes that he or she has lost a significant amount of face and/or control of their life;
8. The perpetrator lacks social support or believes that he or she lacks social support;
9. The perpetrator is making no demands;
10. The perpetrator's conversation level has decreased;
11. The perpetrator is behaving and conversing less rationally and more emotionally;
12. No level of rapport has developed between perpetrator and negotiator;
13. Normative, or integrative, bargaining has decreased or has never been achieved;
14. Suicide threats or cues are apparent.

Recent empirical research has provided support for many of the concepts discussed above. In particular, Taylor (2002a) has developed an elegant but rather complex model of crisis negotiation which he terms a cylindrical model of crisis communication. In this model he

argues that negotiation behavior can be understood in a number of different ways all of which interact with one another. More specifically, he notes that there are three general levels of negotiation behavior ranging from avoidance, to distributive, to integrative levels of interaction. This conceptualization is analogous to the crisis bargaining/normative bargaining continuum discussed by Donohue et al. (1991) and Donohue and Roberto (1993). Next, he observes that there are three different motivational emphases in negotiation behavior. One motivational theme is instrumental in nature, such as making offers, etc. The two other themes are expressive and include the relational theme and the identity theme. The relational theme captures the concept of negotiator/perpetrator interdependence and affiliation, or lack thereof. The identity theme captures the negotiating parties' concern, or lack thereof, for either their own self-presentation, or face, or that of the other party. Finally, Taylor discusses the role of negotiation behavior intensity. Here, intensity refers to affect, in particular as it is manifested in negotiation participant verbalizations.

Using data from nine actual hostage incidents, Taylor (2002a) found empirical support for his model. The cylindrical model posits the existence of nine different regions of behavior that can occur during crisis negotiations. These are termed:

1. Integrative-Instrumental
2. Integrative-Identity
3. Integrative-Relational
4. Distributive-Instrumental
5. Distributive-Identity
6. Distributive-Relational
7. Avoidance-Instrumental

8. Avoidance-Identity
9. Avoidance-Relational

Taylor further argues that different periods of the negotiation will be dominated, though not exclusively, by one of these nine regions. A region is manifested by the expression of concrete verbalizations of a like class. For example, a perpetrator's verbalization "I don't want to talk about that!" and/or "No, no, I didn't touch that girl!" are both avoidance statements. The first is an avoidance-instrumental communication behavior, with an intensity rating of 1, and is coded as Avoid. The second is an avoidance-identity communication behavior, also with an intensity rating of 1, and is coded as Denial. Taylor enumerates thirty seven different classes, or communication behaviors, each of which is separately categorized by orientation, motivation, and intensity.

More specifically, Taylor (2002a) contends that, during the avoidance phase of interaction, one may observe the perpetrator involved in direct attempts to dissociate himself from any responsibility or even knowledge of crisis events (identity theme); or, one may observe the perpetrator unwilling to attempt to develop a relationship with the negotiator (relational theme); or, one may observe the perpetrator using tactics designed to minimize any problem-solving discussion (instrumental theme).

Next, during the distributive phase of interaction, one may observe the perpetrator communicating in a highly critical and insulting manner (identity theme); or, one may observe the perpetrator attempting to justify and/or excuse his actions endeavoring to persuade the negotiator to accept this view as correct (relational theme); or, one may observe the perpetrator making demands, threatening, and rejecting negotiator proposals (instrumental theme).

Finally, during the integrative phase, one may observe the perpetrator agreeing with the negotiator's perspective and even complimenting the negotiator (identity theme); or, one may observe the perpetrator and/or the negotiator encourage, reassure, and express confidence in the other's abilities (relational theme); or, one may observe the perpetrator and/or the negotiator make offers, accept offers, and compromise (instrumental theme).

An intriguing outcome of Taylor's research is his suggestion regarding the concept of entrainment (McGrath and Kelly, 1986). Entrainment relates to the negotiator adjusting his or her communication patterns in an attempt to shift the approach adopted by the hostage taker. Taylor states that the cylindrical model indicates any attempt to induce movement away from one particular mode of communication should focus on behaviors associated with an adjoining region rather than upon the region ultimately desired. In other words, successful negotiations more often than not proceed in little steps as opposed to large ones.

In a second piece of research, Taylor (2002b) empirically demonstrated that negotiation progress and ultimately negotiation success can be judged by the extent competitive, crisis bargaining is supplanted by a more normative, problem-solving approach. He studied 189 interaction episodes and found that episodes associated with unsuccessful negotiation were ranked higher on a partially ordered scale of competitiveness as opposed to those episodes associated with successful negotiations.

Bilsky, Muller, Voss, and Von Groote (2005) studied perpetrator and negotiator affect during negotiation phases, specifically during periods of escalation and de-escalation. According to the authors an escalation phase is characterized by behaviors such as threats or irrevocable commitments, while de-escalation phases are characterized by behaviors that are supportive of problem-solving, compromise, and attempts at resolution. Therefore, an escalation phase is

analogous to the distributive or crisis bargaining phase as noted in the cylindrical model while the de-escalation phase is similar to the integrative or normative bargaining phase. Likewise, it appears that the concept of affect, which Bilsky et al. measure via a hostility scale and a message affect scale, is quite similar to negotiation behavior intensity as described by Taylor (2002a). The results indicated that the overall level of arousal was higher for the perpetrator as opposed to the negotiator throughout the negotiation process; that both the perpetrator and the negotiator experienced higher levels of affect during periods of escalation as opposed to periods of de-escalation; and the change in affect was more pronounced for the perpetrator as opposed to the negotiator when moving from an escalating phase to a de-escalating phase.

Basic Points to Consider:

Crisis negotiation is a team enterprise. The smallest acceptable team is composed of a primary negotiator, secondary negotiator, and a team leader. A more inclusive team is composed of a primary negotiator, secondary negotiator, negotiation team leader, tactical liaison, resource coordinator, and a behavioral science consultant (Fuselier and Van Zandt, 1987; Butler, Leitenberg, and Fuselier, 1993; Lancely, 1999; Feldmann, 2004). Research performed by Butler et al. indicated that 55% of the large police departments, 25% of the small police departments and 59% of the state police agencies employed mental health consultants. The three most common roles of the behavioral science consultant were perpetrator assessment, negotiation technique consultation, and post-incident counseling.

Butler et al. (1993) also reported that those agencies which used behavioral science consultants during hostage and barricade-victim negotiation incidents reported greater number of

successful negotiations and fewer incidents where the perpetrator is killed or hostages injured. However, this trend was not observed in the barricade-no victim incidents studied.

Basic guidelines for the behavioral science consultant hostage negotiation team member to bear in mind are as follows:

1. Be able to demonstrate that you are cognizant of the literature regarding crisis negotiation, that you have attended crisis negotiation courses, and that you have participated in mock crisis negotiations as a part of the law enforcement negotiation team with which you are associated.
2. Be prepared and willing to work within the established organizational structure of the law enforcement organization with which you are consulting.
3. Recognize that the role of primary and secondary negotiator is one filled by specially trained law enforcement personnel not the behavioral science consultant.
4. Recognize that appropriate duties for the psychological consultant are to:
 - i. diagnose and assess hostage/barricade perpetrators;
 - ii. interview significant others during crisis incidents regarding the backgrounds and personalities of the perpetrator and victims. (A guide to questions the consulting psychologist should ask during these interviews is presented in Appendix A.);
 - iii. evaluate negotiation tactics and strategies;
 - iv. help document and record negotiation events as they occur, in particular perpetrator, victim, demand and negotiation progress factors;
 - v. monitor participant stress during hostage/barricade incidents;
 - vi. train negotiation team members regarding mental health issues;

- vii. develop and participate in hostage/barricade training scenarios; and
 - viii. perform research into the characteristics of hostage/barricade incidents as well as the success or failure of negotiation tactics and strategies (Butler, Leitenberg, and Fuselier, 1993; Feldmann, 2004). This, in large part, can be done by developing and maintaining a database of all hostage/barricade incidents which the negotiation team encounters.
5. Remember that crisis negotiation is a five stage process. These stages are termed (a) intelligence gathering, (b) introduction and relationship development, (c) problem clarification and relationship development, (d) problem solving, and (e) resolution. The goal of negotiations is the surrender of the hostage taker and the release of the hostages.
- i. During the first stage, the negotiators gather intelligence, develop a negotiation strategy, and attempt to predict any problems or difficulties that may arise.
 - ii. Stage two starts when the primary negotiator makes contact with the hostage taker. The negotiator attempts to build a relationship, uses active listening techniques, and attempts to defer action on demands until some level of trust and rapport is developed.
 - iii. During stage three, the negotiator continues to build the relationship and at the same time attempts to understand the problem from the hostage taker's point of view. The primary goal for stage three is an implied agreement between hostage taker and negotiator to bargain normatively rather than using brinkmanship.

- iv. Thus, stage four is taken up with the negotiator and hostage taker attempting to problem solve. The negotiator, while continuing to build trust, becomes more directive in his communications. He or she develops proposals and seeks compliance.
 - v. During the final stage of negotiations, the negotiator purposely slows down the pace of communication to ensure that no mistakes are made. The negotiator carefully and explicitly establishes the details of the hostages' release and the hostage taker's surrender by over and over reviewing the proposed scenario in his or her conversation with the perpetrator. Likewise, the negotiator continually assesses the strength of the fragile bond of trust that he or she has developed to make sure that the working relationship remains intact with the hostage taker (Call, 1996).
6. Remember the Behavioral Change Stairway
- i. Employing active listening skills leads to,
 - ii. Empathy, which leads to,
 - iii. Rapport, which leads to,
 - iv. Influence, which leads to,
 - v. Behavioral change.
7. Remember to continually assess negotiation progress and the risk of imminent lethality. To this end record keeping is vital. Negotiation teams should use dedicated software programs to track and analyze negotiation events or keep detailed handwritten notes.

8. Remember to reinforce a negotiation strategy that reinforces the psychological well-being of the captives.
9. Be prepared to provide or arrange for the psychological support to the captives' families during the incident and to provide or arrange for the psychological support of the captives following their release.

Avoiding Evaluation and Consultation Errors: One of the most significant evaluation and consultative blunders to avoid in hostage negotiation is the *action imperative* (Vecchi, 2002). This problem occurs when decision makers decide they need to end a crisis incident *now*, either because the incident has become too lengthy and/or the incident has not yet resulted in any clear-cut resolution. Such a decision usually results in the implementation of a tactical solution, not always with success, and is initiated even though negotiations are in progress. For example, Noesner (1999) argues that the barricade incidents at Ruby Ridge, Idaho and the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas are examples of the *action imperative*, where the eventual high loss of life could have been prevented if the on-scene decision makers had a better understanding of the negotiation process. From the negotiation team's point of view the passage of time is a positive rather than a negative occurrence. This interpretation is based upon the opinion that the effects of time passing usually results in:

1. lowered perpetrator emotionality;
2. increased perpetrator rationality;
3. reduced perpetrator stress;
4. reduced perpetrator expectations;
5. greater opportunity for building rapport between negotiator and perpetrator;

6. greater opportunity for gathering intelligence;
7. better decision making on everyone's part; and,
8. thus, increased likelihood of negotiation success.

Therefore, whenever the negotiation team is asked to consider an option that deviates from recommended negotiation protocol the team members should ask themselves the following questions:

1. Is the action really necessary? Why?
2. Is the action risk effective? Why?
3. Is the action acceptable? Why?
4. Should this action be taken now? Why?
5. In particular, what conditions have changed since the beginning of the crisis incident that support the decision the action should be taken now?
6. Finally, have less risky alternatives been tried?

Unless acceptable answers can be developed for each of these questions the team should seriously consider that the *action imperative* is at work.

Treatment Considerations: The following discussion focuses on the impact, upon the hostages, of captivity, both during the incident as well as after. Being captured, threatened with death, and, perhaps, being physically abused is a severely traumatic experience. More than likely, at first, the captive experiences frozen fright (Fuselier, 1991; Symonds, 1980a, 1980b). Cognitive ability decreases while emotionality increases and the phenomenon of “traumatic psychological infantilism” can occur (Symonds, 1980b, p.40). The victim sample investigated by Giebels et al. (2005) all reported experiencing feelings of helplessness. However, whereas

the kidnapped victims also reported feelings of uncertainty and isolation by far the majority of siege victims did not. Thus, there was a distinct difference noted between victims of siege and kidnapped victims. This difference is hypothesized to be related to the duration of captivity, kidnapping incidents last longer, and to the isolation the kidnapped victim experiences as opposed the victim of a siege.

Subsequent to this initial phase a number of identifiable sets of behaviors and emotions have been observed in hostages. In the past, the present author, as well as others, has used the word, syndrome, as part of the name of these observable behavioral clusters (Call, 2003). However, Giebels et al. (2005) has criticized the use of this word arguing that it suggests the victims are displaying an abnormal psychological process and/or manifesting a psychological defect. The present author disagrees with this reasoning. Different people react differently to severe stress and crises. However, it would seem more logical to expect a victim to display non-typical, or abnormal, behaviors as opposed to typical, or normal, behaviors when he or she is placed in an abnormal, life and death, situation. Demonstrating such non-typical behavior under such circumstances does not mean that the victim possesses a psychological defect, rather such behavior can be explained as a not uncommon reaction to an abnormal event.

In the past, seven emotional and behavioral clusters have been noted in hostages by various authors. These have been termed the Stockholm Syndrome (Hacker, 1976); the Common Sense Syndrome (Strentz, 1977); the Survivor Identification Syndrome (Schlossberg, 1980); the Hostage Response Syndrome (Wesselius and DeSarno, 1983); the Hostage Identification Syndrome (Turner, 1985); the London Syndrome (Olin and Born, 1983); and the “Hysterical-Whiner” Syndrome (Fuselier, 1991). The first five phenomena refer to those situations where the hostage develops positive feelings for the perpetrator(s) and is typically

referred to by Hacker's designation—the Stockholm Syndrome. This phenomenon is oftentimes associated with the victim developing negative feelings toward the authorities.

Recently, Lancelly (1999) and others have argued that the Stockholm Syndrome is relatively rare and that it requires both time and positive contact between the victim and perpetrator. If there is no contact between hostage and hostage taker or if the hostage is abused it is highly unlikely such a phenomenon will develop. Furthermore, if the hostage has had a previous relationship, such as being the ex-wife of the perpetrator, it is unlikely the Stockholm Syndrome will arise. Finally, as noted by Turner (1985) the existence of different cultural values, language, racial, ethnic, religious, or ideological beliefs between hostage taker and captive can actually thwart the development of positive bonding between captive and captor. In fact, in such situations the passage of time can work to increase the hostages' risk of harm. An example of this phenomenon is reported by Jacobson (1973). Jacobson, along with 148 other airline passengers, was held hostage for one week in September 1970 by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The passengers were primarily westerners of Jewish ancestry. An Arab physician was assigned by the hostage takers to provide medical assistance to the captives. However, as the time progressed, the hostages noted that the initially kind and helpful Arab physician became increasingly hostile and rejecting.

Giebels et al. (2005) note that most of victims in their sample reported both positive and negative feelings toward their captors. As predicted by earlier researchers, those victims who were abused reported only negative feelings. It is generally believed that fostering positive feelings within the perpetrator for the victims increases the latter's survivability. Thus, Strentz (1980) argues that the negotiator should promote positive transference between perpetrator and

victim. To help accomplish this he suggests asking the hostage taker about the victims' health and to provide messages for the victims' families.

An example of an instance where a perpetrator perceiving the victim as human probably saved the latter's life is documented by Ochberg (1978). This author reported the experience of Gerald Vaders who was held hostage by South Moluccans in December 1975 on a train in Holland. Mr. Vaders was selected to be executed. Before his execution, Mr. Vaders asked to speak with a fellow hostage. With the hostage takers listening, Mr. Vaders discussed the various problems in his family life leaving instructions for his wife regarding how to deal with a foster child. However, after Mr. Vader was through his captors decided not to kill him. Instead, the perpetrators selected another man and shot him. Mr. Vaders had ceased to be a nonentity but had become a person. Nevertheless, hostage takers who are psychopaths do not care and never will.

The London Syndrome and the Hysterical Whiner Syndrome are instances where the captive acts in a manner which culminates in his or her premature selection for being killed by the hostage takers. In the former situation the hostage is verbally aggressive and provocative while in the latter situation the hostage is overly tearful and frightened. An example of the London Syndrome occurred in 1986 in California. A failed jewelry store holdup turned into a hostage situation. During the incident the perpetrator shot and killed the store security guard even though the victim was tied and lying face down on the floor. Afterwards, the hostage taker explained that he killed the guard because "he was talking back to me" (Fuselier, 1991, p. 714).

An example of the Hysterical Whiner Syndrome occurred in 1985 in New York. An African-American male held a group of White and African-American men and women hostage. The motivation for the incident was to protest against racial discrimination. During the incident, after a demand deadline passed, the perpetrator killed a black female. Afterwards, the hostage

taker explained that he had selected the woman because he was irked by her continual crying and pleading.

After rescue the hostages will require psychological first aid and mental health screening. Past research indicates that a significant proportion of rescued victims will suffer diagnosable mental disorders (Allondi, 1994; Villa, Porche, and Mouren-Simeoni, 1999; Easton and Turner, 1991; Wesselius and DeSarno, 1983). For example, Easton and Turner observed 25% to 50% in their sample of those rescued suffering from emotional problems and Villa et al. observed 72% in their sample. The principal disorder observed is post traumatic stress disorder although phobia, major depression, and separation anxiety have also been noted. Even if a victim does not develop a diagnosable disorder almost all will demonstrate, at least initially, symptoms of PTSD, usually cluster B and cluster D symptoms.

Likewise, the research indicates that the victims' psychological problems will last for some time (Desivilya, Gal, and Ayalon, 1996; Terr, 1991; Van der Ploeg and Kleijn, 1989). For example, Van der Ploeg and Kleijn noted that 32% of their sample reported symptoms after nine years. Terr reported that 100% of her sample reported continued symptoms after four years. Finally, Desivilya et al. reported that even seventeen years after the barricade hostage incident 39% of the survivors reported four symptoms, 52% reported five to eight symptoms and 9% reported nine or more symptoms. The data also indicate that witnessing physical violence, suffering physical abuse, and not receiving psychological help after release are factors correlated with increased risk of long term mental health problems (Bisson, Searle, and Srinivasan, 1998; Desivilya, Gal, and Ayalon, 1996; Villa, Porche, and Mouren-Simeoni, 1999).

When providing psychological services to rescued hostages the following goals should be considered:

1. reassure the victims that their behavior during captivity was acceptable;
2. educate the victims and their families regarding the after effects of captivity;
3. attempt to restore feelings of power within the victims;
4. work to reduce feelings of isolation;
5. attempt to diminish feelings of helplessness;
6. encourage feelings of control;
7. foster a supportive social network amongst the victims; and,
8. prevent others, particularly the media, from intruding upon the victims (McDuff, 1992; (Symonds, 1983)).

Writing Forensic Reports and Testifying as an Expert: Psychologist who consult with law enforcement negotiation teams do not typically write forensic psychological reports for court purposes and/or testify as an expert witness. That is not their primary role. However, it is quite possible that a negotiation team's behavioral science consultant may be called as a witness either in a criminal matter or in a civil action. In such cases the basic guidelines for effective and ethical court room presentation should be followed.

Novel Applications and New Directions: The principal new directions for psychological consultants in crisis negotiation are in the areas of research and training. With the development of HOBAS database ten years ago there now exists the ability to explore, in detail, the dynamics of crisis incidents and negotiation strategy. Utilizing HOBAS data in conjunction with in-depth interviews of incarcerated hostage takers as well as employing such conceptualizations as the cylindrical model of crisis communication and the study methodology used by Taylor (2002a) it

may now be possible to accomplish significant research. Van Hasselt, Flood, Romano, Vecchi, de Fabrique, and Dalfonzo (2005) outline one such ambitious project involving the comprehensive analysis of crisis negotiation in those incidents where the perpetrator has taken or captured a significant other such as a spouse, ex-spouse, child, or partner. Other serious scientists should follow in their footsteps.

Developing and empirically validating the effectiveness of negotiation training techniques is also an important area which is ripe for future endeavors. To date role-playing techniques have been a primary method for negotiator training but little empirical research has been done to validate such methodology (Vecchi, Van Hasselt, and Romano, 2005). One exception is that reported by Van Hasselt, Baker, Romano, Noesner, and Smith (2005). These researchers describe an attempt to validate a role-playing technique as an assessment tool to evaluate crisis negotiation skills.

Also of interest is the work of Taylor and Donald (2004). These researchers, utilizing the cylindrical model of crisis communication and the multi-dimensional scaling technique of Smallest Space Analysis, reported significant differences in simulated negotiations versus actual crisis negotiations. For example, they found that in simulated crisis negotiations the participants used a greater number of avoidance-relational and distributive-instrumental behaviors than in actual negotiations. Knowledge of such differences is crucial to skillful design of future training aids.

Finally, even though the HOBAS database has been developed it remains vital that psychological consultants initiate and maintain their own local and regional databases. Such work will help both to obtain important information regarding local hostage/barricade incidents but also help to analyze negotiation style and effectiveness. To this end detailed record keeping

is key. Record keeping is important not only for research purposes but also for on-site analysis of the crisis event.

In conclusion, although, in the recent past, there has been significant scientific study of crisis negotiation, much more remains to be accomplished. Furthermore, because of his or her scientific training, the crisis negotiation team's psychological consultant is best placed to realize this goal.

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APPENDIX A

INTELLIGENCE DATA COLLECTION GUIDE

It is crucial for the negotiator to obtain relevant information regarding the perpetrator/hostage taker and the hostage/victim(s). Therefore the intelligence team's role is vital. The following questions are provided to help guide investigators and the consulting forensic psychologist when questioning informational sources.

Perpetrator Basic Data:

1. Has the perpetrator used other names? What were they?
2. What name does the perpetrator prefer?
3. What is the perpetrator's age, date of birth, race, height, weight, hair color, eye color?
4. What is the perpetrator wearing?
5. Do you have a picture of the perpetrator? How has the perpetrator's appearance changed since this picture was taken?

Perpetrator's Education:

1. What is the perpetrator's highest level of education?
2. If perpetrator went to college what was his major?
3. What kind of grades did the perpetrator make?

Weapons Information:

1. What kind of weapon does the perpetrator have?
2. Has the perpetrator ever used a weapon against a person before? Please describe.
3. Has the perpetrator served in the military? Please describe.
4. Has the perpetrator had weapons training? Please describe.

Perpetrator's History:

1. **Past aggression:** Does the perpetrator have a history of past aggression? Please describe.
2. **Past aggression:** To your knowledge how often has the perpetrator acted out aggressively over the last twelve months? Please describe.
3. **Similar Incident:** Has the perpetrator ever done anything like this incident before? Please describe.
4. **Similar Incident:** What was the outcome of the previous incident?
5. **Abused Substances:** Does the perpetrator have a history of abusing substances? Please describe.
6. **Mental Health History:** To your knowledge has the perpetrator ever seen a mental health professional? When?
7. **Mental Health History:** What was the doctor's name?
8. **Mental Health History:** Why did the perpetrator seek mental health consultation?
9. **Mental Health History:** What was his diagnosis?
10. **Mental Health History:** What was the medication prescribed?
11. **Mental Health History:** Do you know if the perpetrator is still taking his medication?
12. **Mental Health History:** When talking to the perpetrator's treating mental health professional ask:
 - a. Diagnosis
 - b. Medications
 - c. Has the perpetrator cooperated with treatment? Explain.
 - d. Please describe perpetrator's substance abuse history.
 - e. Does the perpetrator have any positive relationships in his life? With whom?

- f. Describe the current crisis situation and ask the treating mental health professional—What will the perpetrator likely do in this situation? Will they hurt themselves? Will they hurt someone else?
13. **Early Family/Social Maladjustment:** Do you know anything about the perpetrator's early life and/or family? Please describe. Did the perpetrator have serious problems as a child? Did he or she get into trouble a lot? Please describe.
14. **Relationship Problems:** Can you describe the perpetrator's recent home life? Is he or she married or involved in a permanent relationship? What can you tell me about the relationships the perpetrator has had in the past?
15. **Employment Problems:** Is the perpetrator employed? What is his or her employment? How many jobs has he had during his life? How does the perpetrator get along with his co-workers?
16. **Legal Problems:** What can you tell me about the perpetrator's legal history? Has he been in trouble with the law before? Please describe.

Present Psychological Factors:

1. **Insight Problem:** Why do you think the perpetrator is doing this? (Precipitating the present crisis situation)
2. **Anger Problem:** How has the perpetrator been feeling lately? Has he or she been particularly angry? How do you know?
3. **Impulsivity Problem:** Would you describe the perpetrator as an impulsive person? Why?
4. **Impulsivity Problem:** Has the perpetrator complained of people making him angry? Do you know of any verbal or physical fights the perpetrator has been in? Please describe.

5. **Impulsivity Problem:** Does the perpetrator have a number of outstanding parking tickets? Speeding tickets?
6. **Empathy Problem:** Do you think that the perpetrator cares for anybody? Why? Who?
7. **Empathy Problem:** Does the perpetrator have any pets? What kind of pets? How does he or she care for them?
8. **Antisocial attitudes:** Does the perpetrator belong to any gangs? Describe.
9. **Antisocial Attitudes:** Does the perpetrator have a prison record? Describe.
10. **Current Mental State:** How does the perpetrator usually manage stress?
11. **Current Mental State:** What have you observed recently regarding how the perpetrator manages stress—any differences?
12. **Current Mental State:** Have you noticed the perpetrator doing anything recently that didn't seem like him or her? Describe.
13. **Current Mental State:** How would you describe the perpetrators recent mood and behavior?
14. **Current Mental State/Suicide:** Has the perpetrator said anything about committing suicide? What was said?
15. **Current Mental State/Suicide:** Has the perpetrator ever attempted suicide? Describe.
16. **Current Mental State/Suicide:** When was the last time he or she attempted suicide?
17. **Current Mental State/Suicide:** Has anyone in the perpetrator's family ever committed suicide? Describe the circumstances and when it occurred.
18. **Current Mental State/Suicide:** Has the perpetrator been losing weight?
19. **Current Mental State/Suicide:** Has the perpetrator been having trouble sleeping?
20. **Current Mental State/Suicide:** Has the perpetrator been giving away personal property?

21. **Current Mental State/Suicide:** Does today's date have any special significance for the perpetrator? Is so what?
22. **Substance Abuse:** Do you think that the perpetrator is currently under the influence of drugs or alcohol?
23. **Substance Abuse:** When was the last time he or she used this drug or alcohol?
24. **Substance Abuse:** What is the perpetrator's usual behavior when using this drug or alcohol?
25. **Substance Abuse:** What is the perpetrator's usual behavior when he or she is withdrawing from this substance?
26. **Substance Abuse:** Is the perpetrator is Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous? What is his or her AA or NA sponsor's name and telephone number?

Spouse/partner/victim Basic Data:

1. What is the hostage/victim's age, date of birth, race, height, weight, hair color, eye color?
2. What is the hostage/victim wearing?
3. Do you have a picture of the hostage/victim? How has the hostage/victim's appearance changed since this picture was taken?

Spouse/partner/victim Factors:

1. Do you know of any past relationship between the perpetrator and the hostage/victim?
Please describe.
2. Describe the present relationship between the perpetrator and the hostage/victim.
3. Has the perpetrator ever abused the hostage/victim in the past? Please describe.
4. Has there ever been a VPO placed on the perpetrator? Please describe.

5. Do you know of any past relationship between the hostage/victims, i.e. between hostage/victim A and hostage/victim B? Was the relationship positive or negative? Please describe.
6. Does the hostage/victim have a military or law enforcement background? Please describe.
7. Does the hostage/victim have any medical or psychological problems? Please describe.
8. Is the hostage/victim presently taking any medication? Please describe.
9. How do you think the hostage/victim is handling his or her current predicament? Please explain?
10. Do you think the hostage/victim will do anything to provoke the perpetrator during his or her captivity? Please explain.

Table 1

HOSTAGE TAKER TYPOLOGIES

<i>GENERAL CATEGORY</i>	<i>POSSIBLE SUBTYPES</i>
Emotionally Disturbed	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Brain Damaged 2. Elderly/Senile 3. Depressed, Various Types 4. Paranoid, Various Types 5. Schizophrenic 6. Substance Abuser 7. Personal/Family Disputes
Political Extremists	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Reluctant Captors 2. Deliberate Hostage Takers
Religious Fanatics	
Criminals	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Antisocial Personality Disorder/Trapped Criminal 2. Antisocial Personality Disorder/Kidnapper
Prison Inmates	Antisocial Personality Disorder
Combination	

Note. From: Call, J.A. (1996). The hostage triad: Takers, victims, and negotiators. In H.V. Hall (Ed.), *Lethal violence 2000: A sourcebook on fatal domestic, acquaintance and stranger aggression* (pp. 561-588). Kamuela, HI: Pacific Institute for the Study of Conflict and Aggression. Reprinted with permission.

Table 2

ACTIVE LISTENING TECHNIQUES-CORE SKILLS

<i>GENERAL CATEGORY</i>	<i>DESCRIPTION</i>
Emotion Labeling	Negotiator identifies the perpetrator's emotions, e.g. "you sound angry."
Paraphrasing	Negotiator restates the content of the perpetrator's statements.
Mirroring	Negotiator repeats the perpetrator's last few words or the gist of what the individual was saying.
Summarizing	Negotiator restates both the content and the expressed emotion of the perpetrator's statements, e.g. "so what you're saying is that Ruth left you for no apparent reason and you're angry and hurt about that."

Table 3

ACTIVE LISTENING TECHNIQUES-SUPPLEMENTAL SKILLS

<i>GENERAL CATEGORY</i>	<i>DESCRIPTION</i>
Minimal Encouragers	Negotiator uses verbal cues demonstrating attentiveness, e.g. “go-on, okay, then what”.
“I” Messages	Negotiator makes a personal statement to help further rapport, e.g. “I’ve been through a divorce too, so I know how hard that can be...”
Open-Ended Questions	Negotiator asks questions that cannot be answered with a yes or no, e.g. “tell me more about that...”
Silence	Negotiator responds with pauses just before or after meaningful comments, e.g. “Am I understanding you correctly...(pause)...you’re angry with Ruth because”.