

Abstract

Over the last twenty-five to thirty years there has been significant growth in the knowledge base regarding how best to negotiate hostage/barricade crisis incidents. The goal of the present article is to review this evolution. More specifically, this article examines the multiple ways a crisis incident can be classified, analyzes the results of hostage/barricade incident databases, discusses different negotiation techniques and methods of negotiation analyses, and, finally, explores the impact of being taken captive on the victim.

NEGOTIATING CRISES: THE EVOLUTION OF HOSTAGE/BARRICADE CRISIS NEGOTIATION

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Introduction

The act of unlawfully taking a person, and holding that person against his or her will, is, unfortunately, an all too frequent human activity and one that has a history as old as humankind. One of the earliest descriptions of the use of a special weapons and tactical (SWAT) team to recover hostage victims is in the book of Genesis, Chapter 14. In that chapter, there is a description of how Abraham's nephew, Lot, amongst others, was taken captive by the King of Elam. Upon hearing of this disaster, Abraham immediately gathered from his own household a band of 318 specially trained and armed men. Abraham and his men pursued the king and overtook him near the springs of the Jordan. Abraham's men and allies then attacked and routed the king and his army, and pursued those remaining almost as far Damascus. The pursuers then returned to their homeland, bringing back all the spoils and captives that had been carried away.

Abraham's use of the tactical option has been, down through the ages, a typical and, perhaps, the most common way of handling such crises. Negotiating with the captor has been another, though less frequently used, technique. An

early example of this procedure can be found in Greek mythology. Hades, king of the underworld, kidnapped Persephone, daughter of the goddess Demeter. Demeter in her anger caused all the crops on Earth to die. To prevent the destruction of Earth's inhabitants, Zeus sent Eros as his "negotiator" to confer with Hades in an attempt to resolve the crisis. Following these negotiations, Hades agreed to let Persephone return to Earth during the spring of each year. In return Demeter permitted Earth's crops to grow during Persephone's visits but then caused them to die, in the fall, when her daughter returned to the underworld.

Not only is this myth, perhaps, the first recorded use of crisis negotiation but its conclusion may also be the first documented example of the Stockholm Syndrome (Rahe, Karson, Howard, Rubin, & Poland, 1990). The legend concludes that Persephone, although at first terrified of Hades, later fell in love and married him. This paradoxical response to captivity was more recently observed in 1973 when a female hostage divorced her husband to marry a bank robber who had held her and three others captive for 131 hours in the vault of the Sveriges Kreditbank in Stockholm, Sweden (Strentz, 1980).

The idea of negotiating with a captor, although not new, did not receive much modern commentary until after 1972. During the mid-1960's, the concern of law enforcement focused on how best to respond to criminals with more lethal and sophisticated weapons as well as how to deal with societal unrest and terrorist incidents. The answer, it was believed, lay in employing paramilitary

special weapons and tactical (SWAT) teams, analogous to Abraham's 318 specially trained and armed men. In 1967, the Los Angeles Police Department became the first to implement SWAT teams. Thus, by the early-1970's, there were three options to responding to hostage or barricade incidents: (1) the first officer on the scene talked the perpetrator into giving up, (2) law enforcement walked away from the incident, or (3) the police used force (Hatcher, Mohandie, Turner & Giles, 1998).

However, problems arose. For example, in October 1971, during a hijacked airliner incident, the FBI decided to use the tactical option. The episode concluded in the death of two hostages and a perpetrator. In subsequent litigation, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals chastised the FBI's inept handling of the crisis incident finding that they had turned "what had been a successful 'waiting game', during which two persons safely left the plane, into a 'shooting match' that left three persons dead" (*Downs vs. U.S.*, 1975; Higginbotham, 1994).

In March 1972, Palestinian terrorists took eleven Israeli Olympic athletes hostage in Munich, Germany. At the conclusion of that standoff twenty-two people were dead, a policeman, ten terrorists, and all the hostages (Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986). This incident came to be known as the "Munich Massacre".

Because of these and other similar hostage/barricade incidents, law enforcement policy analysts began to rethink the need for alternatives to the tactical option. Accordingly, various metropolitan police agencies and eventually

the Federal Bureau of Investigation designed and implemented hostage recovery programs. In 1973, the New York City Police Department initiated a program that not only included SWAT teams but also detectives trained as negotiators (Bolz & Hershey, 1979; Schlossberg, 1980). Following New York City's lead, the FBI likewise developed a similar program (Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986).

Since the pioneering work of police psychologist, Harvey Schlossberg, and police captain, Frank Bolz, the use of trained crisis negotiators has steadily increased in law enforcement agencies throughout the United States. In 1993, Butler, Leitenberg and Fuselier reported that of those law enforcement agencies who responded to their 1989 survey, 68% of state police agencies (n = 17), 96% of the large municipal agencies (n = 125), and 30% of the small municipal law enforcement agencies (n = 158) indicated that they had a designated hostage negotiator. Research performed in 1998 found that most of these specialists worked only part time as negotiators (94%), were deployed on average about eleven times a year, and received approximately 32 hours of in-service training per year (Bahn & Loudon, 1999).

Over the last quarter century there has been significant growth in the knowledge base regarding these types of crisis incidents and how best to handle them. It is better understood now that the act of capturing and holding a person against his or her will is motivated by a wide variety of reasons. Not all such incidents can be defined as hostage situations. Thus, there has been an evolution in how negotiators identify and fulfill their role. More specifically, the

first generation of specialists primarily saw themselves as “hostage” negotiators; however, the present generation now perceive themselves as “crisis” negotiators. In significant part, this change in self-perception is due to a growing understanding of the similarities and differences between hostage and barricade situations. The goal of the present article is to review this evolution.

Typology Analyses

A primary goal of crisis negotiations is to resolve a standoff with as little loss of life as possible. To do this the negotiator wants to eventually interact with the perpetrator utilizing normative bargaining techniques (Donohue, Ramesh, Kaufmann & Smith 1991). The starting point of the process, however, resides in classifying the incident. Why? Because the key question in any crisis incident is whether or not there exists a bargaining range; and, depending upon the classification or typology of the crisis incident, there will exist, or not, greater or lesser bargaining ability on the part of the negotiator.

By definition, a traditional hostage situation occurs when one or more persons, the hostage taker(s), holds one or more persons, the hostage(s), threatening harm to the latter, unless a third party fulfills the demands of the former. Thus, hostage taking can be defined as a triadic event (Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986; Call, 1996).

Also hostage taking can be seen as analogous to theater, but a theater of terror rather than amusement. The hostage taker is the star, the hostages the supporting cast, and law enforcement and the public the audience. Since the

hostage taker wants something from a third party there is a significant chance that a bargaining range can be found. Characteristics of a hostage situation are as follows: the hostage taker is more or less goal oriented, the hostage taker makes substantive demands-usually including escape, the hostage taker needs police to facilitate demands, the hostage taker's primary motivation is having the demands met not harming the hostages, and the hostage taker realizes that keeping some hostages alive prevents a tactical response.

However, other crisis incidents involving captors and captives can and do occur. These are best termed barricade-victim incidents. From the perpetrator's point of view these are dyadic, rather than triadic, events. Furthermore, instead of being analogous to theater, these crisis situations are more akin to secret rituals. The captor is the avenging priest and the victim the sacrifice.

In the barricade-victim situation the victim is not a hostage in the traditional sense. Rather, the captor holds the victim for an expressive as opposed to an instrumental reason. Instrumental hostage taking occurs when the hostage taker is attempting to achieve a goal or change some aspect of society. Expressive victim taking is motivated by internal emotions and impulses that are often quite personal and obscure (Miron & Goldstein, 1979). In particular, there are no substantive demands made upon a third party by the perpetrator. In fact, the perpetrator wants nothing from a third party.

A classic example is the man who holds his ex-wife at gunpoint, lets his children out of the barricaded house, then, later, shoots his ex-wife and then

himself. The victim is, in fact, a "homicide to be" rather than a hostage (Fuselier, Van Zandt & Lanceley, 1991). Since the captor has what he or she wants, the victim, a bargaining range oftentimes cannot be found. Characteristics of the non-hostage barricade-victim situation include: no clear goal, lack of substantive demands from the perpetrator, absence of rational thinking, focus is directed against the person held, and expressive, emotional, and senseless ventilation is prominently displayed by the perpetrator.

In a third type of situation, there is no identified victim. Rather, the perpetrator is armed and barricaded and the authorities attempt to talk him or her into surrendering. Examples are a trapped criminal who is barricaded in a convenience store, or the mentally ill person who is suicidal, armed, and barricaded in his or her home. Thus, depending upon the situation a bargaining range may or may not be found. See Table 1.

Table 1

CRISIS INCIDENT TYPOLOGIES

<i>TYPE</i>	<i>INTERACTION</i>	<i>DESCRIPTION</i>
Hostage Situation	Perpetrator-Hostage-Third Person(s)	Hostage taker makes substantive demands (usually instrumental, some may be expressive) of a third party threatening harm to hostages if the demands are not met.
Barricade-Victim	Perpetrator-Victim	Perpetrator does not make substantive demands of a third party. Any demands made are typically nonsubstantive in nature.
Barricade-No Victim	Perpetrator	Perpetrator may or may not make demands and may or may not be willing to bargain.

There are several other useful ways to profile crisis situations where crisis negotiation techniques are used. One is to classify the situation as to whether or not the location of the victim and perpetrator is known and contained (a siege) or whether the location is not known and thus not contained (a nonsiege) (Lanceley, 1999). See Table 2.

Table 2

VICTIM LOCATION vs. PERPETRATOR DEMANDS

<i>DEMANDS</i>	<i>LOCATION</i>	
	Known (Siege)	Unknown (NonSiege)
Substantive	Bargaining control probably exists	Bargaining control possibly exists
NonSubstantive	Bargaining control possibly exists	Bargaining control probably does not exist

Depending upon this type of crisis analyses there may exist greater or lesser bargaining ability on the part of the law enforcement negotiator. For example, in a situation where the victim has been kidnapped, the location of the victim and perpetrator is not known, and there are no demands being made of a third party, there is no bargaining control and there is little, if anything, a crisis negotiator can do.

On the other end of the continuum, however, when the perpetrator has kidnapped a victim, the victim and perpetrator are contained within a known perimeter under the control of the authorities, and the perpetrator is making substantive demands, there exists bargaining control on the part of the negotiator.

A more detailed way to analyze the siege subtype of crisis situation is demonstrated in Table 3.

Table 3

SIEGE TYPOLOGIES

<i>GENERAL CATEGORY</i>	<i>DESCRIPTION</i>
Deliberate	Perpetrator deliberately initiates the siege situation—wanting to provoke a response from the authorities. Depending upon other factors, i.e., whether or not the incident is a Hostage Situation or a Barricade-Victim situation, substantive demands may or may not be made.
Spontaneous	Perpetrator inadvertently precipitates the siege situation. Hostages/victims may or may not be present. Substantive demands may or may not be made.
Anticipated	Perpetrator expected that at sometime or another the authorities would seek his or her arrest. Substantive demands are usually not made in a Barricade-No Victim situation. Substantive demands may or may not be made if the siege is also a Hostage Situation.

There are three different types: the deliberate siege, the spontaneous siege, and the anticipated siege. An example of a deliberate siege is a barricade-victim situation involving a jilted male lover and the woman, who is a “homicide to be.” An example of a spontaneous siege is a trapped criminal, with or without hostages. Finally, an example of an anticipated siege is a group of religious fanatics who are collecting illegal weapons and explosives in their compound outside Waco, Texas.

The key for the crisis negotiator is to determine the reason for the siege and determine the nature of the demands being made by the perpetrator, i.e., instrumental vs. expressive and substantive vs. nonsubstantive. Depending upon

the correct analyses of these two factors the crisis negotiator has probably, possibly, and/or little bargaining power.

As observed in the above discussion, analyzing the perpetrator's demand type is crucial. In fact, analyzing the types of demands being made by the perpetrator is another way of understanding and classifying a crisis incident. See Table 4.

Table 4

DEMAND TYPOLOGIES

<i>GENERAL CATEGORY</i>	<i>DESCRIPTION</i>
Instrumental	Demand characteristics best described as "objective", e.g., money, transportation, food, liquor, drugs.
Expressive	Demand characteristics best described as "subjective", e.g., perpetrator wants to talk to family member, perpetrator want to make a statement to the media regarding delusional beliefs.
Substantive	Victims are threatened to obtain concessions from a third party, the demands may be instrumental or expressive.
NonSubstantive	Demands are not made, or, if they are, they are trivial and not related to the reason(s) the victim(s) are threatened.

There are instrumental demands, expressive demands, substantive demands, and nonsubstantive demands. Basically, the crisis negotiator has bargaining power only if the perpetrator has substantive demands. Substantive demands may be either instrumental or expressive. Anecdotal report suggests that one sign of imminent lethality is the determination that the perpetrator is

not demanding anything from a third party to release the hostage/victim (Fuselier, Van Zandt & Lanceley, 1991).

Finally, one last way the crisis negotiator can classify the crisis situation is based upon understanding hostage taker typology (Call, 1996). See Table 5.

Table 5

HOSTAGE TAKER TYPOLOGIES

<i>GENERAL CATEGORY</i>	<i>POSSIBLE SUBTYPES</i>
Emotionally Disturbed	1. Brain Damaged 2. Elderly/Senile 3. Depressed, Various Types 4. Paranoid, Various Types 5. Schizophrenic 6. Substance Abuser 7. Family Disputes
Political Extremists	1. Reluctant Captors 2. Deliberate Hostage Takers
Religious Fanatics	
Criminals	1. Antisocial Personality Disorder/Trapped Criminal 2. Antisocial Personality Disorder/Kidnapper
Prison Inmates	Antisocial Personality Disorder
Combination	

Note. From The Hostage Triad: Takers, Victims, and Negotiators (p. 567), by John A. Call, 1996, in H. H. Hall (Ed.), *Lethal violence 2000: a sourcebook on fatal domestic, acquaintance and stranger aggression*. Copyright 1996 by Pacific Institute for the Study of Conflict and Aggression. Reprinted with permission. Here, a review of the literature indicates that six general types of hostage takers have been observed: emotionally disturbed, political extremists, religious fanatics, criminals, prison inmates, and a combination of two or more of the first five. There are also multiple subtypes.

A brief review of this earlier work by Call (1996) reveals the following.

Starting first with the Emotionally Disturbed category, Fuselier (1988), following Strentz (1986), noted four subtypes. These are (a) paranoid, various types, (b) depressed, various types, (c) inadequate personality, and (d) antisocial personality. The use of the latter subtype is questionable in the context of the Emotionally Disturbed category. This subtype is descriptive of a personality disorder, not an emotional disorder. Logically, it is much more likely that individuals with this personality disorder will be involved in hostage incidents with instrumental motivations, such as a trapped criminal or terrorist skyjacking, rather than the expressive acts of the emotionally disabled.

Likewise, the concept of inadequate personality is believed to be of limited value as a subtype. Inadequate personality disorder is no longer a diagnostic category as noted in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (American Psychiatric Association, 1994)....

In his analysis of the Emotionally Disturbed category of hostage taker, Pearce (1977) described the following subtypes: (a) the brain damaged individual, (b) the elderly/senile individual, (c) the retarded, depressed person, (d) the agitated, depressed

person, (e) the schizophrenic, and (f) the barricaded person as an equivalent to attempted suicide (suicide by cop)....

Kennedy and Dyer (1992), discussing a small sample of men who took their own children hostage, noted that each had a history of alcohol abuse, drug abuse, or both and a family history and ethos of violent and unstable relationships. The hostage taking was initiated by situational stress within the family. A similar phenomenon was reported by Gist and Perry (1985)....

With respect to the Political Extremist, Knutson (1980) described two subtypes: the reluctant captor and the deliberate hostage taker. Her research suggested that the majority of American politically motivated hostage takers, at least until 1980, can be classified as the former subtype. Her interviews with these individuals indicated that they were unwilling, if not unable, to kill their hostages....Knutson summed up their personality style as dreamers and philosophers whose violent act was part of an attempt to right a wrong or a perceived injustice.

Deliberate hostage takers, on the other hand, are perfectly willing to execute their captives. The hostages are discardable implements to be used as long as needed by the hostage taker. They are supremely goal oriented but unfeeling, like a shark seeking a meal. Although uncaring, they are well aware of the

hostages' emotions but use them to their own ends. They will terrorize one minute and act friendly the next in their effort to control the situation....Interestingly, Knutson found in her sample that, as children, both subtypes of hostage takers were likely to have experienced a close brush with death.

There have been other attempts to explain the political extremist from a psychological point of view. Ferracuti (1982) concluded that the best approach to understanding these individuals is to use what he terms "the subcultural theory." In simple terms, political extremists live in their own sealed communities or subcultures with their own unique self-imposed value systems. What may be relevant for the culture at large may be meaningless for the political extremist's subculture and vice versa. To understand a particular subtype of Political Extremist, one must first understand the values and mores of that subculture. Global theories applicable to all political extremists may be unobtainable. Thorough understanding may come only via investigation of each subculture....

[Cooper (1981) first enumerated the general hostage taker category of the Religious Fanatic.] With respect to understanding possible subtypes of this category, the advice of Ferracuti (1982) concerning understanding political extremists probably applies. A

thorough understanding of Religious Fanatics will likely require analysis of a particular cult's internal mores and values.

The Criminal category is usually thought of as consisting of the trapped criminal. For example, the bank robber who is unable to make his escape before the police arrive....The major subtype in the Criminal category is the criminal psychopath. The criminal psychopath is also believed to be a major subtype in the Prison category of hostage taker. However, other subtypes also occur. For example, in the November 23, 1987 Oakdale, Louisiana, riot where 200 Cuban inmates held 26 people hostage at a Federal Detention Center, the only hostage seriously physically injured was stabbed by an emotionally disturbed inmate. This occurrence is also an example of a Combination hostage taker (Call, 1996, p. 564-567).

Depending upon the type and subtype of hostage taker with which the negotiator is dealing experience dictates the use of certain negotiation strategies. For example, Lanceley (1999) makes the following suggestions when negotiating with an individual who is schizophrenic: avoid the use of family members since they may be a part of the delusional system, do not try to talk the perpetrator out of his or her delusional system, let the perpetrator discuss concerns, and, if one of the demands of the perpetrator is media attention, this demand may be a negotiable item.

Database Analyses

In 1996, Call (1996) noted that an ongoing nationwide collection of hostage incident information was not being done. This situation no longer persists. Following the death of 96 Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas on April 19, 1993, then U. S. Attorney General, Janet Reno, directed the FBI to develop a nationwide hostage incident database. Three years later, just eight days before the anniversary of the Waco tragedy, the Hostage/Barricade Report (HoBaS) was disseminated by the FBI to local law enforcement agencies. HoBaS is a hostage and barricade incident data-collecting questionnaire. Whenever a hostage incident occurs, the responding law enforcement agency is requested to complete the HoBaS questionnaire and forward it to the FBI. The HoBaS questionnaire seeks information regarding the (1) incident, (2) nature of contacts made by law enforcement during the incident, (3) resolution of the incident, (4) post incident information, (5) ancillary information regarding negotiator and SWAT interaction and training, (6) subject data, and (7) hostage/victim data.

Prior to the development of HoBaS, only a small sample of relevant databases existed in the public domain. Fortunately, behavioral scientists have continued to research this area (Feldmann, 1998) since public access to HoBaS is difficult. The information in these unrestricted databases is enlightening. However, when analyzing this information one must keep in mind the definitional structure of the data as well as the time frame during which the data was collected.

In the 1970's, Edward Mickolus (1976), later a Central Intelligence Agency analyst, developed a computerized database of 3,329 international terrorist incidents from 1968 through 1977 while a graduate student at Yale. These incidents occurred outside the United States. Mickolus named this database International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events or ITERATE.

Head (1990) was one of the first to thoroughly analyze this database and report his conclusions in the public domain. He was particularly interested in the ITERATE data which included political extremist hostage taking incidents. Head divided the ITERATE database into three subcategories: hijacking, kidnapping, and barricade incidents. He found that from 1968 through 1977 hostage takers usually worked in groups of three or more, hostage incidents were not particularly lethal (in 17% of incidents, hostages were wounded and in 19% of incidents, there were one or more deaths). Barricade incidents were the most lethal, with explosives the most common means. When negotiators were used, incidents were less lethal.

Friedland and Merari (1992) developed a database of 69 international and domestic political extremist hostage taking incidents between the years of 1979 and 1988. These incidents were either a barricade situation or a hijacking of transport. These researchers found that there were usually five or fewer hostage takers (63.3%), the majority of hostages were civilian (59.4%), the average number of hostages in a barricade incident was 35 and the average in a hijacking was 131, the majority of incidents lasted 24 hours or less (43.8%), and

the most common outcome was violent (31.1%). A violent conclusion to the incident was more probable if it was a barricade situation, a trained rescue team was present, and no attempts at negotiation were made.

No more recent databases regarding political extremist hostage taking have been published. However, analyzing the data from 1968, the ITERATE database, through 1988, the Friedland and Merari (1992) database, there appears to be a trend toward political extremist hostage taking becoming more lethal (19% vs. 31.1%). Furthermore, this trend may well be continuing. Anecdotal review of more recent political extremist activity suggests that terrorists appear more prone to kill their captives rather than negotiate. For example, in the United States on September 11, 2001, 239 people were taken temporary hostage by Arab terrorists in four airplane hijackings. Initially, this event may seem comparable to the dramatic capture of four planes over a three-day period by Arab terrorists, almost exactly thirty-one years earlier, in September 1970. However, the unfortunate difference is that in 1970 the terrorists landed the four planes and eventually released the hostages, whereas in 2001 they deliberately killed all the passengers and never attempted to negotiate.

Practically speaking, the data suggests that most American law enforcement negotiators do not deal with political extremist hostage or barricade incidents. Head (1990) developed and analyzed two further databases in his research efforts. One database, the Hostage Event Analytic Database (HEAD),

contained 3,330 incidents of domestic hostage taking which occurred between 1973 and 1982. The majority of the hostage takers fit criminal or prison inmate (52%) or emotionally disturbed (18%) typologies; the majority of hostage takers were young (25% below age 30), white (61%) males (80%) acting alone; the typical number of hostages was one (47%) or two (15%); the most usual location of the incident was a home (20%); the most usual weapon was a handgun (31%); the typical incident duration was less than one day (31% ended within 6 hours); the majority of incidents were non lethal (87%); and a negotiator was usually used during the crisis event (64%).

A third database analyzed by Head (1990) was composed of 137 hostage incidents worked by members of the New York Police Department Hostage Recovery Program from 1973 through 1982. Again the majority of hostage taker typologies was criminal or prison inmate (58%) or emotionally disturbed (26%); the majority of hostage takers were young (46% below age of 30), white (35%) males (87%) acting alone; the typical number of hostages was one (43%) or two (26%); the most frequent incident location was a home (41%); the most usual weapon was a handgun (41%); the typical incident duration was less than one day (61% ended within 6 hours); and the majority of incidents were non lethal (91%).

Butler, et al. (1993) developed a database of 410 hostage incidents that occurred between 1986 and 1988. Of note is the fact that all these incidents were reported by law enforcement agencies that employed negotiators. These

researchers found that the most frequent hostage taker typology was emotionally disturbed (71% in large police departments and 88% in small police departments) and the next most frequent was criminal (15% and 6% respectively), the majority of incidents were non lethal (90%), and the most frequent outcome was a negotiated surrender (65%).

In 1996, Feldmann (1998) began assembling a database of hostage/barricade incidents that occurred in Kentucky (n = 120 incidents). This database is an ongoing project and provides an excellent example of what researchers in every state should be doing.

Feldmann (1998) noted six categories of hostage/barricade incidents in his sample. These categories are (1) personal or domestic disputes (31%), (2) subjects involved in criminal acts (26%), (3) mentally ill persons for whom no other motivation was present (19%), (4) incidents associated with workplace violence (12%), (5) alcohol or drug related incidents (8%), and (6) incidents involving students and schools (5%).

Data analyses made by Feldmann (1998) revealed certain characteristics common to all categories and certain characteristics unique to each category. General characteristics observed were:

1. the acts were usually committed by males under the age of 30;
2. offenders most often acted alone;
3. the perpetrator frequently had a prior criminal record;

4. offenders were most often motivated by an interpersonal dispute or grievance, complicated by an underlying psychiatric disorder;
5. firearms were implicated in nearly three-fourths of the incidents;
6. most incidents resulted in injury or death to either some of the hostages or to the perpetrator (87.5% of cases);
7. nearly all of the offenders had psychiatric diagnoses, regardless of the category to which they belonged;
8. personality disorders, substance abuse disorders, and mood disorders comprised the largest diagnostic groups in the study;
9. the majority of incidents were associated with suicidal intent;
10. alcohol and drug use were relatively common among subjects, either in the form of acute intoxication or a history of abuse;
11. warning signs prior to the incident were apparent in over 60% of the cases, but were infrequently recognized or reported;
12. a majority of incidents were negotiated, but negotiations were successful less than 40% of the time; and,
13. SWAT teams were deployed in over two-thirds of cases, and an assault was carried out in slightly less than 40% of incidents (p. 15-16).

Unique characteristics observed in the personal/domestic category are: (1) hostage takers were primarily white males in their late 20's and early 30's, (2) perpetrators demonstrated greatest risk of suicide compared to other categories, (3) the incident most often occurred in a home, (4) clear warning signs (threats or harassment of victim) were present (80% of cases), (5) victim was current or former spouse, girlfriend, or child, (6) victim was stalked in 66% of cases before the incident occurred, (7) negotiations successful in only 30% of cases, and (8) injuries or deaths occurred in 95% of cases.

Unique characteristics observed in the criminal category are: (1) perpetrators were primarily African-American males with a mean age of 24 years, (2) perpetrators were most often engaged in robbery attempts (74%), (3) negotiations were successful in 68% of cases, and (4) injuries or death occurred in 45% of cases.

Distinctive characteristics noted in the mentally ill category are: (1) most perpetrators were in their mid-30s, (2) most common incident location was a public place such as a mall or government building, (3) a wide variety of weapons were used, not just handguns, (4) high incidence of barricade situations without hostages, (5) demands were bizarre or nonexistent, (6) resolution most frequently a tactical assault, and (7) relatively low injury or fatality rate.

Distinctive characteristics observed in the workplace violence category are: (1) perpetrators were older individuals, usually in their mid-40s, (2) 50%

had served in the military, (3) over 60% had an excessive interest in weapons, (4) prior warning signs and stalking were common, (5) there was a very high likelihood of injury or death, (6) very high likelihood of suicide, and (7) very low likelihood of negotiation success.

As noted earlier, substance abuse was associated with all six categories. The alcohol and drug related category, though, is classified as one wherein the perpetrator either was attempting to obtain substances or was under the effects of acute intoxication as the only motivations for the incident. Unique factors observed in this category were: (1) handguns were frequently used, (2) injuries or deaths occurred quite early in the incident, (3) initiating negotiations was quite difficult, and (4) however, once negotiations begun there was a high success rate.

Finally, the student category contained the following unique characteristics: (1) the youngest perpetrators, with a mean age of 18, (2) the highest number of hostages, from 10 to 40, (3) the perpetrators carried multiple weapons, and (4) once negotiations begun success rate was high.

The databases discussed above represent most, if not all, of the statistical research that exists in the public domain. Except for this database research the majority of the scientific investigation into crisis negotiation has been performed by law enforcement personnel and the few behavioral scientists that work with them. Likewise, most of this work is anecdotal and theoretical in nature. Almost

no empirical research has been performed. Thus, much work remains for future investigators.

Negotiation Analyses

Perpetrators involved in a hostage or barricade situation, even if the incident is planned or anticipated, are almost always in a state of autonomic nervous system hyper-arousal. Increasingly narrow and constricted thinking, decreased attention span, heightened emotionality, and a disorganized, shot gun approach to problem solving characterize this crisis state. The initial tasks of the crisis negotiator are (1) establish rapport, (2) stall for time, and (3) gather information.

The key question facing the negotiator in any hostage/barricade situation is whether or not a bargaining range exists. In the true hostage situation, such a range can often be found. In a non-hostage situation, such as a barricade-victim incident, there is often little or no opportunity for bargaining control. Deciding what type of situation the negotiator faces determines whether he or she uses both crisis intervention and bargaining techniques or primarily uses just crisis intervention techniques.

In true hostage situations the hostage taker initially attempts to utilize a crisis bargaining style best defined as brinkmanship. Crisis bargaining, or brinkmanship, is characterized by (1) the use of coercion, (2) bargaining for high stakes, (3) focusing on only one alternative, (4) the feeling of urgency, (5) high emotional content, (6) prevalence of face or ego issues, (7) lack of complete

information, and (8) failure to work out detailed plans (Donohue, Ramesh, Kaufmann, & Smith, 1991). On the other hand, the negotiator attempts to move the hostage taker's bargaining style away from coercive brinkmanship to one of cooperative, normative bargaining. Normative bargaining is based upon the concept of *quid pro quo*. To do this, negotiators attempt to slow down the interaction, develop multiple options, avoid face issues, control emotions, and create information resources.

As a starting point the negotiator must develop a relationship (Schlossberg, 1980; Rogan, Donohue & Lyles, 1990). This is best conceptualized as a negotiation within a negotiation (Donohue & Roberto, 1993) and requires something more than urging the subject to "just trust me." Lanceley (1999) notes that "contrary to what some people might suppose, the primary skill of good negotiators is not smooth talking, but practiced listening" (p. 17). Therefore, after introducing oneself to the perpetrator and asking if anyone has medical needs, the negotiator uses active listening techniques to help build rapport. Active listening is defined as the ability to view a situation from another's perspective and to let that person know that one understands that perspective. See Table 6.

Table 6

ACTIVE LISTENING TECHNIQUES

<i>GENERAL CATEGORY</i>	<i>DESCRIPTION</i>
Emotion Labeling	Negotiator labels and responds to perpetrator's emotions not just his or her statement content.
Paraphrasing	Negotiator summarizes perpetrator's statements.
Reflecting or Mirroring	Negotiator repeats the perpetrator's last word or phrase with a rising inflection suggesting a question.
Minimal Encouragers	Negotiator uses short questions to encourage further statements.
"I" Messages	Negotiator lets the perpetrator know how and why the negotiator is feeling a certain way and what the perpetrator can do to remedy the situation.
Open-Ended Questions	Negotiator asks questions that cannot be answered with a yes or no.
Silence	Negotiator responds with silence that, in context, encourages the perpetrator to make further statements.

Active listening is also the primary tool of crisis intervention. Empirical research by Donohue and Roberto (1993) suggests that, for good or ill, negotiators and perpetrators develop a relatively stable relational pattern fairly quickly in the negotiation process.

Initially, Donohue, et al. (1991) viewed hostage negotiations as a five stage process: (1) intelligence gathering, (2) introduction and relationship development, (3) problem clarification and relationship development, (4) problem solving, and (5) resolution. Later research suggests that context plays an important role and no one model best describes how negotiations may

progress. In other words, negotiation may progress in a stage fashion moving from crisis bargaining toward normative bargaining via phases; or negotiation progress may be interdependent with integrative and distributive bargaining intertwined; or the negotiation may remain fixed and separate with the perpetrator remaining in crisis bargaining mode while the negotiator attempts to bargain normatively (Donohue & Roberto, 1996).

Also, initially, negotiation success was defined as the surrender of the perpetrator and release of the hostage/victims. Although this is an enviable goal, in some cases it may not be realistic. No longer does a tactical solution equate to a negotiation failure. Rather negotiating success is judged by stabilizing an incident through "verbal containment," keeping law enforcement officers from making dangerous entries, buying time for intelligence gathering and resource arrival, and preventing further loss of life.

No matter what the ultimate outcome of the crisis incident, the negotiator is always responsible for developing and sharing with the on site commander two key expert opinions. These are (1) the extent of negotiation progress and (2) an estimate of the likelihood of imminent lethality.

Review of the crisis negotiation literature reveals that there are eleven factors that indicate that progress is being made in a crisis negotiation (Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986; Fuselier & Van Zandt, 1987; Fuselier & Romana, 1996; Lanceley, 1999; Crisis Management Consultants, Inc., 2002). These negotiation progress factors are:

- There have been no additional injuries since negotiations have begun
- Verbal and physical threats are decreasing
- Conversation on the part of the perpetrator is increasing
- The perpetrator is making more personal statements
- The perpetrator is making fewer instrumental demands
- Rapport is developing between the primary negotiator and the perpetrator
- The perpetrator is demonstrating lowered emotionality (via voice level, etc.) and increased rationality
- Normative bargaining is increasing and crisis bargaining, or brinksmanship, is decreasing
- Deadlines made by the perpetrator have passed with no further injuries
- Some of the hostages have been released
- The perpetrator is discussing the surrender process.

Signs of imminent lethality are:

- Perpetrator has initiated a deliberate confrontation with the authorities and has made no attempt to escape
- The victim is known to the perpetrator and was selected by the perpetrator
- There is a history of problems between the victim and perpetrator
- Perpetrator is not making any substantive demands

- Perpetrator has a history of similar incidents
- Perpetrator has suffered multiple recent stressors
- Perpetrator perceives a loss of face and/or control
- Perpetrator lacks social support systems
- Additional injuries have occurred since the negotiation started
- Threats against the hostage(s)/victim(s) are increasing
- Perpetrator's emotionality is increasing and rationality decreasing
- Conversation is decreasing
- No rapport between negotiator and perpetrator
- Perpetrator is making suicide threats or giving suicide clues (Fuselier, Van Zandt & Lanceley, F. J., 1991; Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986; Fuselier & Romana, 1996; Lanceley, 1999; Crisis Management Consultants, Inc., 2002).

The above literature, while anecdotal in nature, is the result of many years of practical experience. Most of the authors are ex-FBI hostage negotiators and, at one time or another, worked closely with the FBI Hostage Rescue Team headquartered at the FBI Academy. However, it should be noted that the above negotiation progress factors, as well as the signs of imminent lethality, are not equally weighted in importance. Rather, these factors and signs are recommended as guideposts that, when taken in context with the totality of the crisis situation, help the negotiator develop an expert opinion as to progress and imminent threat of lethality.

Crisis negotiation is a team enterprise. An important maxim is that one never negotiates alone. At a minimum there should be a primary negotiator, a secondary negotiator, and a team leader. Depending upon the circumstances there may be more elaborate seven person teams staged in three shifts. Each shift would have a primary negotiator, secondary negotiator, negotiation team leader, tactical liaison, resource coordinator, and behavioral science consultant (Fuselier & Van Zandt, 1987; Lanceley, 1999).

Documentation of the negotiation process is critical. The secondary negotiator, or the recorder on larger teams, needs to record all negotiation events. This is important not only to reconstruct events for court testimony but, more importantly, to help acquire, categorize, and analyze perpetrator, victim, demand, and negotiation progress factors thus focusing the negotiator and commander as to what is happening.

During the latter part of the 1990's, the FBI evaluated, but did not implement, a dedicated computer software program entitled the Personality Profile Module Computer Program (PPM). This ambitious program was designed, in part, to help negotiators keep track of negotiation events as they occurred. The program also included encrypted internet access to HoBaS data, threat assessment scales, subject and incident history forms, personality profile data, suggested negotiation and incident strategies, and report writing features.

Recently, another more user-friendly software program has been published; this time in the public domain. This program is entitled the Crisis

Negotiator and is made up of thirteen databases arranged in five modules. These modules are termed (1) Perpetrator/Victim Data, (2) Demands-Objectives-Assessment, (3) Lethality Assessment, (4) Negotiation Analyses, and (5) Action Guides. The Crisis Negotiator is designed to help systematize and understand perpetrator demands, negotiator objectives, measure and analyze negotiation progress, assess the potential for lethality, and, finally, note and measure warning signs of imminent lethality on the part of the perpetrator (Crisis Management Consultants, Inc, 2002). Careful documentation and analysis is key for crisis negotiation success. Therefore, negotiation teams need to utilize dedicated software programs or keep detailed handwritten notes.

Victim Analyses

Being held against one's will and threatened with bodily harm and/or death is an obvious psychological trauma. Such trauma has severe psychological and behavioral repercussions, both for the short and long term. Initially, the victim typically experiences the phenomenon of frozen fright (Symonds, 1980a; Symonds, 1980b; Fusilier, 1991). With his or her freedom of movement taken away the victim cannot flee. Thus, in fear, he or she focuses all their attention on the perpetrator. The hostage taker reinforces this focus of attention so as to maintain and increase his control. The victim experiences dissociation between thought and behavior. Behaviorally, the victim typically demonstrates a cooperative pseudo-calmness. Cognitively, the victim loses the ability to think

rationally. Emotionally, the victim is in turmoil. Symonds terms this second initial phase of captivity "traumatic psychological infantilism" (1980b, p. 40).

Following the initial shock of being taken captive, a number of identifiable, but sometimes different, emotional and behavioral clusters have been observed in victims. These have been variously termed as (a) the Stockholm Syndrome (Hacker, 1976); (b) the Common Sense Syndrome (Strentz, 1977); (c) the Survivor Identification Syndrome (Schlossberg, 1980); (d) the Hostage Response Syndrome (Wesselius & DeSarno, 1983); (e) the Hostage Identification Syndrome (Turner, 1985); (f) the London Syndrome (Olin and Born, 1983); and, what may be termed (g) the Hysterical-Whiner Syndrome (Fuselier, 1991).

The first five syndromes enumerated above refer to the paradoxical situation where the victim develops positive feelings for the hostage taker. This is often associated with negative feelings directed toward the authorities. When a hostage taker does not harm his or her victim, then sometimes the captive feels a sense of gratitude. Symonds (1980b, p. 41) describes this as "pathological bonding" and most crisis professionals utilize Hacker's term, Stockholm Syndrome, when discussing the phenomena.

Although once thought a common hostage experience, presently most crisis negotiators believe that the Stockholm Syndrome occurs infrequently and only under certain, specific conditions. The two conditions which may precipitate the development of the Stockholm Syndrome are time and positive contact between victim and perpetrator. However, the positive contact must be initiated

by the hostage taker (Lanceley, 1999). If there has been no contact between the hostage taker and victim or if the hostage taker has abused the hostage, the Stockholm Syndrome will not appear. Also, it is highly unlikely that a victim who has had a previous relationship with the perpetrator will develop the Stockholm Syndrome. Likewise, different cultural values, lack of a common language, and preexisting racial, ethnic, religious, or ideological prejudices can work against the development of a positive bond between hostage taker and victim. In fact, in these situations, the passage of time may actually increase the risk of harm to the hostages since the perpetrator's negative view of the victim is selectively reinforced (Turner, 1985).

The last two syndromes mentioned above refer to the unhappy situation where a victim acts in such a manner that the hostage taker kills them. The London Syndrome was observed in 1981 during the Iranian Embassy siege in London, England. During the siege, a hostage named Abbas Lavasani continuously argued with the hostage takers even though his fellow hostages urged him not to do so. When, after several days into the siege, the hostage takers decided to kill a hostage they chose Lavasani. The same phenomenon occurred in June, 1986, in Beverly Hills, California. After a botched jewelry store holdup turned into a hostage situation, the perpetrator killed a security guard who was tied and laying face down on the floor. The hostage taker killed the hostage because the latter "was talking back to me" (Fuselier, 1991, p. 714).

The Hysterical-Whiner Syndrome represents the other extreme of the continuum. As opposed to the aggressiveness of the London Syndrome, a victim who draws attention to himself or herself by crying, whining, and/or being overly solicitous or overly compliant characterizes this latter syndrome. Such an incident occurred in Rochester, New York, in 1985. The perpetrator was a black man who was holding a group of white and black men and women hostages. The principle motive for the hostage taking was perceived racial discrimination. Nevertheless, when a deadline passed without his demands being met the perpetrator selected a black woman to kill. He did so because he was irked by the victim's continual crying, whining, and pleading for mercy.

Rescued hostages require special care. Following rescue, a significant proportion of victims will suffer diagnosable mental disorders secondary to their experience, principally post traumatic stress disorder (Wesselius & DeSarno, 1983; Allondi, 1994; Vila, Porche, & Mouren-Simeoni, 1999). For example, Easton and Turner found that between a 25% and 50% of the British subjects who were held hostage in Kuwait during the 1991 Gulf War reported psychological problems nine to ten months after their release (1991). Likewise, two months after a school hostage incident in Paris, Vila, Porche, and Mouren-Simeoni (1999) observed diagnosable mental disorders in 72% of the children evaluated (26 out of 29 children hostages). More specifically, they noted seven cases of PTSD, eleven cases of subclinical PTSD, three cases of separation anxiety, one case of phobia, and two cases of major depressive disorder.

Furthermore, it appears that the victims' psychological problems can last for a long time. For example, Van der Ploeg and Kleijn noted that 32% of the 138 hostages they studied reported continuing psychological trauma nine years after the Netherlands train hostage incident (1989). Terr observed that 100% of the 25 children hostages she studied reported continuing psychological problems four years after the Chowchilla school-bus kidnapping incident (1991). Desivilya, Gal, and Ayalon (1996) found that even seventeen years after a barricade hostage event at a school in Israel, the majority of the 76 survivors reported symptoms of traumatic stress (39% reported four symptoms; 52% reported five to eight symptoms; and 9% reported nine or more symptoms).

Certain factors appear to be correlated with increased risk of long-term psychological problems following victim rescue. These are witnessing physical violence, suffering physical violence, and not receiving psychological debriefing after release (Desivilya, Gal, & Ayalon, 1996; Bisson, Searle & Srinivasan, 1998; Vila, Porche, & Mouren-Simeoni, 1999).

McDuff (1992) states that specially trained intervention teams need to work with released captives before they return to their everyday life. The goal of this intervention is to educate the victims and their families with respect to the psychological consequences of trauma, foster a supportive social network amongst the victims, and to act as gatekeepers between the victims and intrusive others, in particular the media. Symonds (1983) notes that treatment for released hostages should revolve around reassurance that the victim's

behavior during captivity was acceptable, restoration of feelings of power, reduction of feelings of isolation, diminishment of feelings of helplessness, and encouragement of feelings of control.

Conclusion

Over the past thirty years, a vast literature has developed regarding crisis negotiation; nevertheless, more work needs to be done. Four areas that are ripe for research are: (1) documentation and analysis of hostage/barricade events; (b) analysis and improvement of crisis negotiation techniques; (c) development and improvement of victim treatment techniques; and (d) exploring the impact of the media on the outcome of hostage/barricade events. It is particularly important to note that local hostage/barricade incident databases be maintained, similar to the one kept at the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, University of Louisville School of Medicine (Feldmann, 1998). Careful documentation and analysis is crucial not only for individual negotiation success but also for developing a better understanding of crisis events. Thus, it is recommended that negotiating teams make greater use of dedicated software programs, such as the Crisis Negotiator, during crisis incidents. The structured information generated by such software programs help meet both the immediate goal of resolving the crisis incident as well as the long term goal of providing a systematic record of the event for inclusion in regional databases. With the development and maintenance of regional databases, local hostage recovery programs will be better able to obtain relevant information regarding

hostage/barricade incidents in their community and analyze their negotiation style and effectiveness.

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